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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1993) and 63-
46b-16 (1993). 
On August 18, 1994, this Court issued a Notice of 
Consideration for Summary Disposition to review the issue of 
whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
present Petition for Review. On September 2, 1994, Petitioners, 
Merit Electrical & Instrumentation, Juretich, Schiffman, Johnson, 
and Vaness (referred to hereinafter collectively as "Merit"), 
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Disposition, 
asserting that this Court has jurisdiction because the agency order 
in this case is final under the Collateral Order Doctrine. 
Thereafter, Judge Jackson issued an Order, denying the Court's 
motion for summary dismissal and deferring ruling on the 
jurisdictional issue until plenary presentation and consideration 
of the issues raised by the Petition for Review. Merit's arguments 
for appellate jurisdiction in this case are fully set out in their 
memorandum attached as Addendum A. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is it unlawful for the Respondent, the Department of 
Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("Division") to convert citation proceedings to a formal 
adjudication in light of its own procedural rules mandating that 
contested citations be conducted as informal adjudicatory 
proceedings? 
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Standard of Review: Merit raised this issue before the 
Division in the Memorandum in Support of Request for Review of 
Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings dated, 
May 5, 1994. See Addendum B, Memo, at 4-7. Utah appellate courts 
review challenges based on an agency's failure to follow its own 
procedures for correction of error. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4) (e) (1993); Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 
370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
2. Assuming arguendo that the Division has discretion to 
convert proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4, has the 
Division abused its discretion? 
Standard of Review: Merit raised this issue before the 
Division in the Objection to Motion and Order Converting Contest of 
Citations, dated March 3, 1994, and in the Memorandum in Support of 
Request for Review of Order Converting Citation to Formal 
Adjudicative Proceedings, dated May 5, 1994. See Addendum C at 4 
and Addendum B, Memo, at 8. A challenge to an agency decision in 
the face of a purported statutory grant of discretion is affirmed 
only if the agency decision is reasonable and rational. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16 (h) (i) (1993); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). 
3. Does conversion under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3), deny 
Merit equal protection? 
Standard of Review: Merit raised this issue before the 
Division in the Memorandum in Support of Request for Review of 
Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings, dated 
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May 5, 1994. See Addendum B, Memo, at 16. Utah appellate courts 
show no deference to an agency's decision regarding the 
constitutionality of governing statutes or the constitutionality of 
an agency's decisions. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reviews 
constitutionality of the Division's decision to convert the 
contested citation hearing to a formal proceeding in this case for 
correctness. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) (1993); Ouestar 
Pipeline v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 
1991); Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) . 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
administrative rules are determinative of the issues on appeal. 
The text for each of these is attached in full at Addendum D. 
1. United States Constitution, amendment XIV, § 1. 
2. Utah Constitution, article I, § 24. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1993). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993). 
5. Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1994). 
6. Utah Admin. R156-46b-403 (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, Merit challenges an order of the Division 
converting citation proceedings from informal to formal. 
On or about December 9, 1993, the Division issued citations 
to Merit Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc. and four employees 
alleging violations of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-1 et seq. (1994) .* The Division claims that 
Merit Electrical violated § 58-55-2(32)(c)2 of the Act by hiring 
unlicensed and non-exempt electricians as employees to perform 
electrical construction work in connection with a refinery 
modernization project owned by Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation, 
located near Salt Lake City, Utah. The Division claims that each 
of the individuals cited violated § 58-55-2(32) (a)3 by engaging in 
a construction trade requiring a license (electrical) while not 
licensed or exempted from licensure. Merit contests the citations 
because the electrical work at the site is "construction and repair 
relating to . . . metal and coal mining" and is therefore exempt 
from licensure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994).4 
Merit timely filed notice with the Division contesting the 
citations, denied violating the Act, and requested a hearing in 
accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq. , and the applicable rules at 
Utah Admin. R156-46b-l (1994), et seq.5 Despite the classification 
1
 Effective May 2, 1994, the Construction Trades Licensing Act was 
renumbered. Thus, § 58-55-1 became § 58-55-101. In this brief, Petitioners will 
refer to sections of the Act by reference to the numbering system that was in 
effect at the time the citations were issued and which appear on the citations. 
The corresponding new sections will be referenced in footnotes the first time any 
section appears in the body of the brief. 
2
 Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501(3) (Supp. 1994). 
3
 Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501(1) (Supp. 1994). 
4
 Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(2) (Supp. 1994). 
5
 As of August 31, 1994, the Division amended the rules governing 
agency adjudicatory procedures, but did not change the substance of the rule 
sections cited in this brief. Citations to the Division's rules will be to those 
in effect at the time the Conversion Order occurred. The corresponding new rule 
numbers will be cited in a footnote the first time a citation to a rule occurs. 
Copies of the new rules are included in Addendum E. 
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of hearings to contest citations as informal proceedings under 
R156-46b-202(1)(m),6 the Division, on February 11, 1994, filed a 
Motion to Convert to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings ("Motion to 
Convert"). That same day, the presiding officer granted the 
Division's motion and issued an Order Converting Citation to Formal 
Adjudicative Proceedings. Merit timely filed an objection to the 
Division's motion and the presiding officer's order. In response, 
the presiding officer vacated his order on March 4, 1994. After 
both parties submitted further responsive pleadings, the presiding 
officer conducted a hearing on the Motion to Convert on March 28, 
1994. On April 5, 1994, the presiding officer issued a second 
Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudication Proceedings 
("Conversion Order"). Merit filed a Request for Review of Order 
Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings, dated May 
5, 1994. The Executive Director of the Department of Commerce 
issued an Order on Review which denies Merit's Request for Review. 
Merit asks this Court to vacate the April 5, Conversion Order7 
because the Conversion Order: (i) violates the Division's proce-
dural rules, (ii) is unlawful under the governing statute, (iii) 
was an abuse of discretion, insofar as the governing statute pro-
vides discretion, and (iv) denies Merit equal protection under the 
law. 
6
 Corresponding to Utah Admin. R156-46b-202(1)(n). 
7
 Two orders are currently at issue: (i) the Department of Commerce's 
Order on Review, issued on June 27, 1994, in which the Director of the Department 
of Commerce refused to review the Conversion Order, and (ii) the underlying 
April 5 Conversion Order. Except as separately referenced, these orders will be 
collectively referred to as the Conversion Order. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 9, 1993, the Division issued citations to 
Merit Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc. and four of its 
employees alleging violations of the Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act. Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-1 et seq. (1993). 
2. The Division bases the citations on its allegation that 
Merit Electrical hired unlicensed electricians to perform 
electrical construction work in connection with the refinery 
modernization project owned by Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation 
and thereby violated § 58-55-2 (32) (c) of the Construction Trades 
Licensing Act. 
3. With respect to the individual employees, the Division 
alleges that they engaged in electrical contracting work without a 
license or without exemption from licensure in violation of § 58-
55-2(32) (a) . 
4. Citations were timely contested in accordance with the 
instructions included on the citations, the UAPA, and the 
applicable agency rules, which provide that contested citations be 
adjudicated as informal proceedings for which an evidentiary 
hearing is required. See Utah Admin. Code R156-46b-202 (1) (m) 
(1994). Merit contests the citations because the electrical work 
at the site is "construction and repair relating to . . . metal and 
coal mining" and is therefore exempt from licensure under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994). 
5. On February 11, 1994, despite its own rule, which 
classifies hearings to contest citations as informal, see Utah 
Admin. R156-46b-202(1)(m) (1994), the Division filed a Motion to 
Convert to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. See Addendum F. 
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6. On the same day, the presiding officer, without the 
benefit of briefing, issued an Order Converting Citation to Formal 
Adjudicative Proceedings. See Addendum G. 
7. In response to the Merit's objection, the presiding 
officer vacated the order on March 4, 1994. See Addendum H. 
8. On April 5, 1994, the presiding officer issued a second 
Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. See 
Addendum I. 
9. On May 5, 1994, Merit filed a Request for Review of the 
Conversion Order, see Addendum B, and a Notice of Substitution of 
Counsel. 
10. On June 27, 1994, the Executive Director of the Depart-
ment of Commerce issued an Order on Review denying Merit's Request 
for Review on the ground that the Department has no jurisdiction to 
review the Conversion Order, and remanded the proceedings to the 
Division. See Addendum J. 
11. Merit timely filed a Petition for Review with this Court 
on July 27, 1994. 
12. The Court of Appeals issued a Notice of Consideration for 
Summary Disposition on August 18, 1994, on the grounds that the 
Petition For Review is taken from an interlocutory agency order and 
the Court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
13. On October 7, 1994, after the parties filed memoranda 
supporting their positions, Judge Jackson issued an order denying 
the Court's own motion for summary dismissal and required plenary 
presentation of the case. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Merit has petitioned this court to vacate the Conversion 
Order, which converts consolidated citation proceedings from an 
informal to a formal adjudication. The effect of the conversion is 
to change the procedures used at the administrative hearing level 
and, more significantly, to alter the nature of judicial review of 
the agency decision. Specifically, the Conversion Order, in 
denying Merit's objections, justified the Division's failure to 
comply with the its own rules mandating citation proceedings to be 
conducted as informal hearings, by placing reliance on the 
Division's policy manual which contains model forms for conversion 
and by summarily relying upon the language contained in the Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4, which provides for conversion of agency 
proceedings in limited circumstances. The order concluded that the 
explicit statutory prerequisites which require conversions: (i) to 
be in the public interest and (ii) not to be prejudicial to the 
parties, had been met. 
The reasoning and conclusions of law underpinning the 
Conversion Order are flawed, and as a result the order violates the 
Division's own rules, is contrary to law, and is otherwise an abuse 
of discretion. Merit further asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 
deprives Merit of equal protection under the law, both because the 
conversion statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied 
in this case. 
As an initial matter, the Conversion Order is contrary to the 
Division's own rules that contested citations be adjudicated as 
144442 8 
informal proceedings which include a required evidentiary hearing. 
Nowhere in the rules is there a reservation of discretion to change 
the mandated informal hearing. Moreover, on its face, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-4 does not permit conversion in cases where the 
Division has designated a particular proceeding as informal by 
rule. Statutory language aside, an agency cannot promulgate a rule 
that limits its statutory discretion and then exercise its 
discretion, as if the rule did not exist. In this case, the 
Division limited its discretion to convert by promulgating a rule 
that mandates an informal proceeding for contested citations. 
Therefore, it cannot now convert to a formal proceeding. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Division has authority to 
convert, it has abused its discretion in this case because the 
Conversion Order fails to satisfy the statutory requirements for 
conversion. The hearing procedures the presiding officer seeks, 
and uses to justify the conversion, are already available as part 
of the informal evidentiary hearing mandated by the Division's own 
rules discussed in the Division's policy manual. Examination of 
witnesses, submittal of rebuttal evidence and use of the expertise 
of the Contractor's Licensing Board are all, as sought, available 
to the Division in the context of the informal hearing. Thus, the 
basis for justifying the public interest is purely illusionary. 
Similarly, the criterion that the parties will not be prejudiced is 
not met. When an agency engages in an unlawful procedure or fails 
to follow prescribed procedures, it is presumed, as a matter of 
law, that the party claiming relief has been "statutorily 
144442 S 
prejudiced." Furthermore, the conversion denies Merit the right to 
a de novo trial (where the rules of evidence and civil procedure 
are fully applicable). Thus, neither prong of the conversion 
statute has been met and it must be reversed as an abuse of 
discretion. 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 is unconstitutional 
both on its face and as it applied in this case because it deprives 
Merit, as part of a class contesting citations, of equal protection 
of the law. In order to provide equal protection to all parties 
contesting citation proceedings, the statute must insure that 
similarly situated parties within the class are treated similarly. 
The conversion statute does not, on its face, provide such 
justification. The criteria, especially the public interest 
requirement, are vacuous in that they provide no guidance for 
determining which parties are selected from a similarly situated 
class for different treatment. The class in this case consists of 
parties contesting citations, yet, the statute provides no guidance 
for either identifying that class or for determining which parties 
from the class are singled out for a different procedural track. 
Denial of equal protection by the application of the statute is 
evidenced by the fact that the Division converted only one other 
citation proceeding from a formal to an informal proceeding. 
Accordingly, the conversion statute must be considered to be 
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited. 
144442 10 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DIVISIONS CONVERSION ORDER MUST BE VACATED AS 
THE ORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION'S OWN 
PROCEDURAL RULES, IS CONTRARY TO LAWf AND IS 
OTHERWISE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Conversion Order, dated April 5, 1994, must be vacated as 
the reasoning and conclusions of law underpinning the order, and 
denying Merits' objections, are flawed. The order violates the 
Division's own procedural rules, is contrary to law and is 
otherwise an abuse of discretion. 
Specifically, the Conversion Order concludes that any argument 
that the conversion is in violation of the Division's own 
procedural rules, Utah Admin. R156-460-202(1)(m) and 403(3) is 
without merit, because the Division's Bureau of Investigations, 
Policies and Procedures Manual ("Division's Policies") "anticipated 
that such conversions to formal proceedings would occur in 
appropriate cases and included model forms drafted for the purpose 
of conversion of such cases to formal proceedings." See Conversion 
Order at 2 (Addendum I). The Conversion Order further concludes 
that Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) "clearly provides, 'any' informal 
proceeding may be converted to form proceeding." See Addendum I at 
Having summarily dismissed the binding effect of its own 
rules, the order then goes on to review the criteria for 
conversion, that is: (i) is conversion in the public interest and 
(ii) does conversion unfairly prejudice any party. The presiding 
officer found that the public interest criterion was met because 
the Merit proceeding is "highly disputed in what may be a novel 
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interpretation of the facts and law which may require the cross 
examination of witnesses and require submittal of rebuttal evidence 
in order [to] fully address the issues in the case, and may require 
the expertise of the Contractor's Licensing Board." Conversion 
Order at 3 (Addendum I) . As to any prejudicial effect, the 
presiding officer found that: (i) informal proceedings did not 
provide adequate procedures for adjudicating the issues involved 
and (ii) denying Merit the right to a district court was not a 
basis for conducting an informal proceeding. 
Each of these arguments must fail. First, the Conversion 
Order is unlawful for the simple reason that the Division has 
failed to follow the procedure which it has prescribed for itself 
in Rule 156-46b-202 (1) (m) . It is the basic tenant of 
administrative law that an agency cannot violate its own rules and 
regulations. Those rules have the force and effect of law and 
equally bind the agency and those being regulated.8 Second, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1993) , on its face, does not permit 
conversion when an agency has chosen, by formal rulemaking, to 
mandate that a particular class of proceedings be adjudicated 
informally. The language of the statute aside, after a rule 
mandating a particular type of proceeding has been promulgated, the 
Division has, de facto, chosen to limit any grant of discretion 
8
 Even the Division recognizes that its own rules have the force of 
law. The Division's Orientation and Reference Manual for Professional Licensing 
Board Members, states: "There are two basic types of laws with which the Boards 
and Division deal in the licensing and regulation of designated occupations or 
professions. . . . The first are statutes. . . . The second type of law are 
rules." Orientation Manual at 8 (1994) (Addendum K). 
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that it might otherwise have. Lastly, assuming arguendo the 
Division retains discretion to convert licensing procedures from 
informal to formal proceedings, the Conversion Order in this case 
cannot stand because it fails to satisfy the statutory requirements 
for conversion. In short, the Division can find no refuge in Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-4 for converting the instant proceedings and the 
order should be vacated. Each of these arguments is addressed, in 
turn, below. 
A. The Division1s Conversion Order Must be Vacated as the 
Order is Contrary to the Division1s Rules Which Mandate 
that Contested Citations Shall be Adjudicated by an 
Informal Proceeding with an Evidentiary Hearing, 
1. The Division1 s Rules Mandate that an Informal 
Proceeding with an Evidentiary Hearing be Conducted 
to Adjudicate the Citations at Issue in This Case, 
The UAPA provides two tracks for adjudicative proceedings 
within state agencies--formal and informal. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-4 (1993), all agency adjudicative proceedings are formal 
unless the agency's rules designate that they are informal. Formal 
adjudications embody a trial-like proceeding that includes, among 
other characteristics, discovery, motion practice, an evidentiary 
hearing on the record, intervention, and written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 through 10 
(1993). For an informal proceeding, however, discovery and 
intervention are prohibited, and no hearing occurs unless provided 
for by rule or statute.9 See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1993) . 
9
 A hearing may be conducted on the record at the request and expense 
of the parties and the production of evidence may be required at the hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(e) & (2)(a) (1993). 
144442 13 
Most importantly, while the UAPA guarantees a trial de novo in 
district court to parties to an informal proceeding, with attendant 
appeal, a party to a formal proceeding can only appeal an 
unfavorable ruling to an appellate court with the attendant limited 
review (e.g., appellate courts grant great deference to agency 
factual determinations). Id. at 63-46b-15 and 16. Thus, the most 
critical difference between a formal and informal adjudication is 
that parties to an informal adjudication can obtain two levels of 
judicial review--at the district court and appellate court--whereas 
parties to a formal adjudication have only one opportunity for 
review. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l) (1993), the Division 
has designated proceedings to adjudicate contested citations issued 
under the Construction Trades Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-
55-13(4) (1994),10 as informal. See Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1) (m) 
(1994) . Furthermore, as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5, the 
Division's rules specifically mandate an evidentiary hearing for 
adjudication of contested citations. Utah Admin. R156-46b-403(3) 
(1994) . 
Merit contested the licensing citations issued to them in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-13(4) (1994). Despite its 
own rule mandating that contested citations be informally 
adjudicated, the Division successfully converted the citations 
proceedings from informal to formal. The effect of this conversion 
10
 Corresponding to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-503(4) (Supp. 1994). 
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is to place Merit on a procedural track which is contrary to the 
Division's rules and therefore contrary to law.11 
2. The Conversion to a Formal Proceeding Violates the 
Division#s Procedural Rules. 
By converting the citations proceedings to a formal 
adjudication in the face of its own rules mandating an informal 
adjudication with an evidentiary hearing, the Division has violated 
its own procedural rules. In State ex rel. Department of Community 
Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally held that agencies must 
abide by their own procedural rules or face reversal on appeal. 
The Division has engaged in the same sort of procedural misstep as 
the agency in Merit and must similarly be reversed. 
In Merit, the Merit System Council excluded a Department of 
Community Affairs representative from an administrative hearing, 
despite the fact that the Merit Council's procedural rules provided 
that a representative of the agency could be present during such a 
hearing. The Court held that "administrative regulations are 
presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or 
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the 
essence of arbitrary and capricious action." Id. Accordingly, the 
Court remanded the case to the agency because "[t]he council cannot 
violate its own procedural rules." Id. ; see also Frisby v. United 
11
 By failing to comply with its own rules and by placing Petitioners 
on a different track with a different set of procedural safeguards, the Division 
has also deprived them of due process. See D.B. v. Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (the Division's 
unlawful procedure or decision making process constitutes due process violation) . 
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States Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev. , 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3rd Cir. 
1985) ("Failure on the part of the agency to act in compliance with 
its own regulations is fatal to such action."); Hartnett v. 
Cleland, 434 F. Supp. 18 (D.S.C. 1977) (when an administrative 
agency takes any action affecting the rights of a party, the agency 
"must scrupulously comply with its own rules and regulations"). 
The Division in this case is attempting to do exactly what the 
Merit Court prohibited--violate its own procedural rules. The 
transgression is blatant. The Division's rules provide for an 
informal adjudication with attendant de novo review in district 
court, and yet the Division has converted to a formal proceeding 
with limited appellate review. 
Moreover, the regulatory scheme governing this case 
illustrates the Division's special concern for and attention to 
contested citation adjudications. The Division did not simply 
classify citation hearings as informal, but also "required" an 
evidentiary hearing for such proceedings. Utah Admin. R156-46b-
403(3) (1994). This is noteworthy because "[e]videntiary hearings 
are not required for informal division adjudicative proceedings 
unless required by statute or rule, or permitted by rule and 
requested by a party . . . ." Utah Admin. R156-46b-403 (1) (1994). 
While the Division designated some twenty proceedings as informal, 
see Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1) (1994), it required the additional 
safeguard of a hearing only for contested citations and one other 
proceeding. See id. at 46b-403(3). 
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In the same vein, the Division's Policies state that informal 
proceedings are intended to address the specific issue in dispute 
in the instant case: "Was there a legal basis to issue the 
citations?" See Division's Policies at 45 (Addendum L). When a 
party contests the legal basis of a citation the Division's 
Policies provide certain explicit procedural rights. For example, 
parties are entitled to "testify, present evidence, and comment on 
the issues at the hearing. In putting on evidence Respondents may 
testify, call and examine witnesses, and introduce evidence." Id. 
at 37. This framework suggests that the Division thoughtfully 
contemplated the nature of such adjudications and devised a 
proceeding that limited the complexity involved in discovery and 
intervention, but that ensured procedural rights commensurate with 
the complexity of issues involved with contested citations. 
The Division cannot now abandon its own procedural rules. 
"Such is the essence of arbitrary and capricious action" and 
constitutes reversible error. Merit. 614 P.2d at 1263. 
3. The Utah Administrative Procedure Act Requires This 
Court to Vacate the Conversion Order, 
Based on the forgoing discussion, the Division has clearly 
violated its own procedural rules by converting the citations to a 
formal proceeding. The UAPA explicitly requires that Merit be 
granted relief from the Conversion Order. 
Under the UAPA: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 
by any of the following: 
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(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993). Once an appellate court 
finds that an agency failed to follow its own procedures, it 
presumes substantial prejudice and grants relief. Krantz v. Utah 
Dept. of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . Having 
shown that the Division has "failed to follow [its] prescribed 
procedure," Merit respectfully requests this Court to grant relief 
by vacating the Conversion Order. 
B. Utah Code Ann, S 63-46b-4 Does Not Authorize Conversion 
of Proceedings Designated bv Rule as Informal. 
Careful reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 reveals that 
the statute does not permit conversion of proceedings that an 
agency has designated informal by rule. Accordingly, the Division 
has no statutory or regulatory discretion to convert Merit's 
citations proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1993), which the Division relies on 
to convert the citation proceedings, provides: 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate cate-
gories of adjudicative proceedings to be 
conducted informally according to the 
procedures set forth in rules enacted under 
the authority of this chapter . . . . 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection 
(3) , all agency proceedings not specifically 
designated as informal proceedings by the 
agency's rules shall be conducted formally in 
accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
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(3) Any time before a final order is issued in 
any adjudicative proceeding, the presiding 
officer may convert a formal adjudicative 
proceeding to an informal adjudicative pro-
ceeding, or an informal adjudicative 
proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is 
in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding 
does not unfairly prejudice the 
rights of any party. 
(emphasis added). When read in isolation, subsection (3) appears 
to allow conversion of any proceeding. However, when the three 
sections are read as a whole, it becomes apparent that subsection 
(3) serves solely to modify default proceedings delineated in 
subsection (2) . The Legislature did not preface subsection (1) 
with the same limiting language as subsection (2), and therefore 
intended subsection (1) to stand alone and independent of 
subsection (3). If the Legislature intended for subsection (3) to 
apply to designated hearings, such as the hearings at issue in this 
case, it would have made subsection (1) "subject to the provisions 
of Subsection (3)," as it did with subsection (2). Cf. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that omission of or reference to a 
specific adjacent subsection of a statute evidences legislative 
intent) . Since the Division, by way of Rule 156-46b-202 (1) (m) , has 
specifically designated contested citation hearings as informal 
adjudicative proceedings, the proceedings in this case fall within 
the ambit of subsection (1) , and are therefore not subject to 
Conversion under subsection (3) . Accordingly, the presiding 
144442 19 
officer acted beyond his statutory authority in converting the 
present adjudication to a formal proceeding, and the Conversion 
Order is void. 
Setting the language of the statute aside, the Division 
cannot, as a matter of law, convert Merit's citation proceedings. 
By lawfully promulgating a rule designating citation proceedings as 
informal, the Division abrogated any discretion it claims under the 
Conversion Statute to convert Merit's hearing from an informal to 
a formal adjudication. Once an agency promulgates a rule limiting 
its discretion, it cannot reassert its authority to exercise 
discretion while its rule is in effect. It is well established 
that "[e]ven if the action of an agency is discretionary by 
statute, the agency's own regulations must be complied with by the 
agency after they are issued." California Human Dev. Corp. v. 
Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1049 (D.D.C. 1985). 
The seminal case in this area illustrates the point. In 
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shauahnessy. 347 U.S. 260, 98 
L.Ed. 681, 74 S. Ct. 499 (1954), the Immigration Act of 1917 
provided the Attorney General with authority to exercise discretion 
in considering appeals to deportation decisions. The Attorney 
General had issued regulations which delegated that authority to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals. When the Attorney General 
interfered with an appeal of a deportation order, the Supreme 
Court held that "as long as the regulations remain operative, the 
Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board or 
dictate its decision in any manner." Id. at 267, 98 L.Ed. 686. 
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Therefore, even though a statute provided the Attorney General with 
certain discretionary powers, he could not exercise those powers 
because "the regulations prescribe the procedure to be followed in 
processing an alien's application for suspension of deportation." 
Id. at 267, 98 L.Ed. 686. See also John S. Service v. John Foster 
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S. Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1957) (even 
though statute granted Secretary of State broad discretion in 
discharging employees, Secretary was nonetheless bound by the 
agency's procedural rules, which limited that discretion). 
To the extent the Conversion Statute provides the presiding 
officer any discretion to convert a proceeding, the Accardi 
Doctrine applies with equal vigor to the instant case. The 
Division has opted to promulgate rules that limit its discretion by 
providing for a particular procedural track, namely the informal 
track. The Division has limited its discretion further by 
mandating a particular type of hearing for informal proceedings 
related to citations. See Utah Admin. R156-46b-403(3) (1994) 
(evidentiary hearing required). 
In the very same rule that governs this proceeding, the 
Division retained its discretion to convert other proceedings.12 
For example, Utah Admin. R156-46b-202(1) (q) (1994) provides that 
declaratory orders are designated informal "when determined by the 
director to be conducted as an informal adjudicative proceeding." 
It is disingenuous for the Division to say now that it silently 
12
 The Division has not promulgated a rule retaining discretion to convert 
informal proceedings to formal. 
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retained discretion to convert contested citation proceedings when 
it explicitly retained discretion for another type proceeding in 
the same rule, but did not do so for citation proceedings such as 
those at issue. 
Just as the regulation in Accardi prescribed the procedures 
to be followed for deportation appeals, the Division's rules 
governing this case prescribe the procedure for citation hearings. 
The Division cannot now attempt to exercise discretion under the 
statute while its own rule, which limits its discretion, is in full 
force and effect. By doing so the Division violates its own 
procedural rule, which is fatal to its decision. See Frisby v. 
United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Devel.. 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 
(3d Cir. 1985) ; State ex rel. Department of Community Affairs v. 
Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980). 
C. Even if Conversion is Permissible for Adjudications 
Mandated as Informal, in This Case, the Division Fails to 
Satisfy the Statutory Requirements for Conversion Under 
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-4(3). 
Even assuming the Division has authority to convert, the 
Division has failed to meet the statutory requirements for 
conversion in the instant case, and thereby abused its discretion. 
The Conversion Statute provides that the presiding officer may 
convert an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal proceeding 
only if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the 
public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (1993) . Despite the UAPA requirement 
that both conditions for conversion be met, the presiding officer's 
decision to convert this hearing fails to meet either prerequisite. 
1. The Presiding Officer Failed to Show that the Conversion 
Order is in the Public Interest. 
The presiding officer's basis for converting is summarized in 
the Conversion Order: 
the proceeding to be conducted are [sic] 
highly disputed in what may be a novel 
interpretation of the facts and law which may 
require the cross examination of witnesses and 
require submittal of rebuttal evidence in 
order to fully address the issues in the case, 
and may require the expertise of the 
contractors licensing board. 
See Conversion Order at 3 (Addendum E) . Close scrutiny of the 
presiding officer's rationale shows that these factors do not 
support a finding that conversion is in the public interest. The 
procedures that the presiding officer seeks are already available 
under the informal evidentiary hearing mandated by the Division's 
own rules. 
The resolution of Merit's citations requires the Division to 
resolve exactly the kind of issue contemplated by an informal 
adjudication. The Division's Policies provide: 
The only issues properly before the presiding 
officer are as follows: 
a. Was there a legal basis to issue the 
citation? 
b. If so, was it fair to issue the citation? 
c. If so, what is the appropriate penalty? 
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See Division's Policies at 45 (emphasis added) (Addendum L) . The 
question confronting the presiding officer in the instant case is 
whether there is a legal basis for the citations issued to Merit, 
that is, whether Merit's activities fall within the statutory 
exemption from licensure for persons "engaged in 
construction and repair relating to . . . metal and coal mining." 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994). The fact that this issue is, 
in the words of the presiding officer, "highly disputed" has no 
bearing whatsoever on the public interest. If "highly disputed" 
issues can serve as a reasonable basis for conversion, the Division 
could convert any time a party does not acquiesce to the 
allegations in a citation. 
Additionally, conversion is not necessary so as to avail the 
Division of the procedures identified in the Conversion Order. 
Those procedures are equally available in the mandated informal 
proceeding. The presiding officer simply failed to recognize the 
extent of procedures available in an informal adjudication for 
contested citations. The UAPA explicitly provides parties to an 
informal hearing with the right to "testify, present evidence, and 
comment on the issues." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1) (c) (1993). 
While the UAPA is silent on the right to cross-examine, the 
Division's Policies and Procedures provide that parties can 
"testify, call and examine witnesses, and introduce documentary 
evidence."13 See Division's policies at 37, (Addendum L). Since 
13
 The UAPA is entirely silent on cross-examination and rebuttal 
evidence with regard to informal hearings. When the Legislature wanted to 
prohibit an activity during informal proceedings it did so explicitly. For 
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it would violate due process for an administrative agency to permit 
parties to testify without permitting cross-examination, see D.B. 
v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 
1145 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the right to "examine witnesses" 
necessarily implies the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine. Furthermore, the presiding officer can "issue subpoenas 
or other orders to compel production of necessary evidence." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(e) (1993). These informal adjudication 
procedures, provide the presiding officer an ample procedural 
armamentarium for resolving whether Merit's activities are exempt 
from licensure as "construction and repair relating to . . . metal 
and coal mining." 
Similarly, the presiding officer's claimed need for the 
expertise of the Contractors and Electricians Licensing Boards can 
be adequately addressed through an informal proceeding. The 
Director of the Division has authority to designate "an individual 
or body of individuals to conduct or to assist the director in 
conducting any part or all of an adjudicative proceeding." Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-1-109(1) (1993). If the director believes that the 
issues surrounding resolution of the citations require the 
expertise of the Contractors Licensing Board or the Electricians 
Licensing Board, he can designate those boards to assist the 
presiding officer during the informal adjudicative proceeding. In 
example the UAPA explicitly prohibits discovery and intervention for informal 
proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(e) and (g) . Interestingly, Utah Code 
Ann. § 3-46b-6-10# which outline formal proceedings, is also silent on whether 
rebuttal evidence is allowed. 
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essence, the Board can become a de facto expert for the presiding 
officer. Consequently, a formal proceeding offers absolutely no 
additional opportunity for the presiding officer to utilize the 
expertise of the Contractors and Electricians Licensing Board. 
In a separate vein, the Contractors and Electricians Boards 
are unlikely to provide any expertise in this matter. The main 
issue to be decided in this case is whether Merit's activities are 
exempt from licensure because electrical work at the refinery is 
"construction and repair relating to . . . metal and coal mining." 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) (1994). While these boards might well 
have specialized insight into construction and electrical issues, 
they have no more expertise in determining whether a particular 
activity is related to an integrated mining operation than they 
have in assessing whether a particular activity constitutes the 
practice of law. Consequently, the involvement of these boards 
will be wholly unhelpful in adjudicating the citations and cannot 
justify the Conversion Order on the basis of being in the public 
interest. 
In view of the presiding officer's inherent fact finding 
powers, his basis for justifying the public interest is purely 
illusory and cannot withstand the slightest scrutiny. Accordingly, 
since the presiding officer did not fulfill his burden of showing 
that the public interest requirement under the conversion statute 
is met, the Conversion Order does not satisfy the dual requirements 
of the Conversion Statute and must be vacated as an abuse of 
discretion. 
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2. The Conversion Order Unfairly Prejudices Merit. 
The Conversion Order similarly falls because the presiding 
officer failed to meet the second requirement for conversion, which 
provides that the presiding officer must show that conversion "does 
not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party." Utah Code Ann, § 
63-46b-4 (3) (b) (1993). When an agency engages in an unlawful 
procedure, or fails to follow prescribed procedures, a court 
presumes that the party claiming relief has been "substantially 
prejudiced." Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 371 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this case, the Division has failed to 
adjudicate Merit's citations informally as its own rules prescribe. 
See Utah Admin. R156-46b-202 (1) (m) . Furthermore, as is more fully 
discussed elsewhere in this brief, conversion denies Merit the 
right to a de novo trial, where the rules of evidence and civil 
procedure are fully applicable with no deference to the agency's 
findings and conclusions Accordingly, Merit has been unfairly 
prejudiced, and the Conversion Order fails. 
Despite the requirement that the presiding officer show that 
both requirements under the Conversion Statute be met before 
converting a proceeding, he failed to show that either requirement 
is met in this case. The basis for the Conversion Order is 
therefore, outside "the bounds of reasonableness" and the 
Conversion Order constitutes an abuse of discretion. Morton Int'1, 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991) . 
Merit therefore asks this Court to vacate the Order and to remand 
this case for an informal adjudication before the Division. 
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II. THE CONVERSION STATUTE. UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-46B-4Q). 
DENIES MERIT EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. 
The Conversion Statute is unconstitutional both on its face 
and as it is applied in this case because it deprives Merit, as 
part of a class contesting citations, of equal protection under the 
law. It is unconstitutional on its face because it permits the 
Division to create two adjudicatory tracks, formal and informal, 
for similarly situated parties. These tracks embody very different 
procedural rights, particularly where the right to judicial review 
is concerned. In order to provide equal protection to all parties 
contesting citation proceedings, the statute must ensure that 
similarly situated parties within a class are treated similarly. 
Yet, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 allows conversion under subpart (3) 
if conversion is in the public interest and if conversion will not 
prejudice the rights of any party. Without more, on its face, 
these criteria cannot provide sufficient criteria to ensure that 
those who are similarly situated will be treated the same. Just as 
importantly, as applied in this case, the Conversion Statute 
violates equal protection guarantees because it has allowed the 
Division to single out Merit for unfair treatment different than 
others who contest citations. 
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A. The Conversion Statute is Unconstitutional on its Face. 
At its core, the principle of equal protection14 means 
"persons similarly situated should be treated similarly," Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) . As to parties before 
administrative agencies, "[e]gual protection protects against 
discrimination within a class." State Tax Comm'n v. Department of 
Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) . When a statute unfairly 
creates two classes, that statute "must be considered to be 
arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited." Id. at 1298. 
There is nothing particularly novel about this argument. Utah 
courts consistently strike down statutes that permit agencies to 
create two classes from a similarly situated group. In Amax 
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 
1990) , for example, the Utah Supreme Court held that a tax statute 
violated the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution by 
unfairly creating two classes of taxpayers. In that case, the 
State and Tooele County assessed properties for tax purposes by the 
same method. However, a statute permitted the State to tax 
property at 100% of its assessed value and permitted Tooele County 
to tax property based on 80% of its value. The Court reasoned that 
the statutory classification of property on the basis of who taxed 
it created two classes of properties assessed by the same method. 
Therefore, the classification "arbitrarily discriminated against 
14
 Utah Constitution Article I, section 24 reads: "All laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
"principles and concepts embodied in the federal equal protection clause and the 
state uniform operation of the law provision are substantially similar." Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
144442 29 
one class merely because it is a state-assessed property." Id. at 
1261. Since the discrimination bore no reasonable relationship to 
the statutory scheme, the statute violated the uniform operation of 
the law clause in the Utah Constitution. Id. : see also Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 52 (Utah 1993) (medical malpractice statute of 
limitations denied equal protection because it discriminated 
against minors) ; Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) (guest 
statute denied equal protection because it singled out nonpaying 
passengers from a larger class); Continental Bank and Trust Comp. 
v. Farminaton City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979) (licensing tax 
arbitrarily created an impermissible class for tax purposes); 
Broadbent v. Gibson, 140 P.2d 939 (Utah 1943) (Sunday closing law 
unconstitutional because it treated similar businesses 
differently). 
In a similarly reasoned case, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
the Tax Commission singled out the State Insurance Fund for unfair 
treatment by making it pay a tax that private insurers did not have 
to pay. State Tax Comm'n v. Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 
1978). In holding the statute authorizing the tax 
unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that while "the legislature 
has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications 
the court must determine whether such classifications 
operate equally on all persons similarly situated." Id. at 1298. 
When a statute permits a party to be singled out for unfair 
treatment, the statute "must be considered to be arbitrary and 
constitutionally prohibited." Id. 
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Like the statutes in Amax and Department of Finance, the 
Conversion Statute permits the Division to create two classes from 
among similarly situated parties--one class receives an informal 
adjudication by rule and the other receives a formal adjudication 
by conversion. Additionally, the Conversion Statute provides no 
useful criteria for assuring that parties subject to conversion 
receive equal protection. The Conversion Statute merely provides 
that the presiding officer can convert if: (i) conversion is in 
the public interest and (ii) conversion does not unfairly prejudice 
any party. 
In order to meet equal protection requirements, a statute must 
justify creating separate classifications from a similarly situated 
group to ensure that parties within that classification are treated 
similarly. The Conversion Statute does not, on its face provide 
such justification. These criteria, especially the public interest 
requirement, are vacuous in that they provide no guidance for 
determining which parties are selected from a similarly situated 
class for different treatment. The class in this case consists of 
parties contesting citations, yet, the statute provides no guidance 
for determining which parties from that class are singled out for 
a different procedural track. Accordingly, the Conversion Statute 
"must be considered to be arbitrary and constitutionally 
prohibited." Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2 at 1298. Merit therefore 
asks this Court to vacate the Conversion order that was issued 
pursuant to the statute. 
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B. The Conversion State i s Unconstitutional as Applied in 
this Case. 
In order for the Conversion S ta tu te to be cons t i tu t iona l under 
equal pro tec t ion p r i nc ip l e s , "[w]hat i s c r i t i c a l i s tha t the 
operation of the law be uniform." Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 
(Utah 1993) . The Conversion S ta tu te has been used in t h i s case 
unfa i r ly to s ingle out Merit for conversion to the formal 
adjudicatory t rack . 
The fact tha t Merit was singled out for specia l treatment i s 
evidenced by the Div is ion ' s response to Mer i t ' s GRAMA reques t s . 
Those requests i l l u s t r a t e tha t of the 1,313 c i t a t i o n s issued since 
October 1992, only s ix have been converted to formal adjudicat ion. 
See Div is ion ' s Response to Request for Record at tached as 
Addendum M. Five of these s ix consis t of the c i t a t i o n s in t h i s 
case. Even considering only the 314 cases l i s t e d as going to 
hearings,1 5 the Division has singled out Merit from a la rge group 
of s imi la r ly s i tua t ed p a r t i e s for s ingular , specia l treatment among 
those.1 6 Id. 
By converting the c i t a t i o n hearings, the Division deprives 
Merit of the r i gh t s embodied in an informal proceeding. Most 
s i gn i f i can t ly , the Division has deprived Merit of the r igh t to 
l i t i g a t e t h e i r claims in d i s t r i c t court . The UAPA provides tha t 
15
 The Attorney General's o f f i c e l a t e r c l a r i f i e d t h i s GRAMA response by 
l e t t e r which s ta ted that , a f ter reviewing the D i v i s i o n ' s docket, only 58 
c i t a t i o n s ac tua l ly went to hearing. 
16
 A Utah appel late court can take j u d i c i a l not ice jus t as any t r i a l 
court can. Under the Utah Rule of Evidence 201, t h i s Court can take j u d i c i a l 
not ice of the D i v i s i o n ' s response to a GRAMA request . See Moore v. Utah 
Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 639 n.17 (Utah 1986) (Supreme Court can take 
j u d i c i a l not ice of administrative proceedings and a c t i o n s ) . 
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parties to an informal adjudication are entitled to de novo trial 
in district court, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1520 parties to a formal 
hearing are entitled only to appellate review. Id. at § 63-46b-16. 
Appellate review differs tremendously from a de novo trial. A de 
novo trial in district court provides a party appealing an 
administrative agency decision the opportunity to present its case 
to an impartial trier of fact for a fresh look under the Rules of 
Evidence. An appeals court, on the other hand, grants substantial 
deference to the administrative agency, and will only overturn an 
agency's decision on limited grounds. See id. : see generally 
Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); SEMECO Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 849 
P.2d 1167, 1170-74 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). The 
Conversion Statute, therefore, permits the Division to 
substantially reduce Merit's access to judicial review relative to 
that afforded to other parties who contest citations. 
Since the Conversion Statute arbitrarily discriminates against 
Merit by allowing the Division to deprive them of rights available 
to other similarly situated parties, the statute denies Merit its 
right to equal protection under the law. Merit accordingly asks 
this Court to vacate the Conversion Order because it constitutes an 
agency action based on a statute that "is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) (1993). 
CONCLUSION 
By converting Merit's hearing to a formal adjudication, the 
Division has engaged in an unlawful procedure by failing to follow 
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its own procedural rules that require an informal hearing for 
contested citation hearings. The Division's claim to convert by 
the discretion granted in the Conversion Statute is erroneous 
because the Division forfeited that discretion when it promulgated 
the rule mandating an informal hearing for contested citations. 
Furthermore, the Conversion Order fails to meet the two statutory 
requirements set out in the Conversion Statute. First, the 
Conversion Order fails the public interest requirement because the 
presiding officer justified the Conversion Order on the illusory 
notion that additional procedures are necessary to adjudicate the 
instant case. However, an informal proceeding with an evidentiary 
hearing already provides him all the additional procedures that he 
seeks. Secondly, conversion fails to satisfy the no prejudice 
requirement because it allows the Division to convert in 
contravention of its own prescribed proceedings. Finally, the 
Conversion Statute violates Merit's right to equal protection 
because it permits the Division to create two classes, one that 
receives a mandated informal hearing with two-level judicial 
review, and one that receives a formal hearing with single-level 
judicial review. Because the statute fails to provide sufficient 
criteria for distinguishing which parties obtain a particular 
track, it unfairly and arbitrarily classifies parties contesting 
citations. By applying the Conversion Statute in this case, the 
presiding officer deprived Merit of equal protection by denying it 
the opportunity to adjudicate its case informally. Accordingly, 
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Merit respectfully asks this Court to vacate the Conversion Order 
and to remand this case for an informal agency adjudication. 
DATED this & day of December, 1994. 
JAMES B. LEE 
BARBARA K. POLICH 
WILLIAM J. STILLING 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this u day of December, 1994, 
I caused to be delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PETITIONERS1 BRIEF, to: 
Robert K. Hunt 
Utah Assistant Attorney General 
111 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810 
N / 0 ^ 7 hcj[ c^ S\ r^-^J^j 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * 
MERIT ELECTRICAL & 
INSTRUMENTATION, a 
corporation, and JONATHAN CARL 
JURETICH, CHRISTOPHER M. 
SCHIFFMAN, DAN A. JOHNSON, and 
KIT VANESS, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841, 
1917, 1918 and 1842 
(Consolidated) 
COURT OF APPEALS # 940435-CA 
* * * * * * * * 
Pet i t ioners submit t h i s Memorandum in response to t h i s cou r t ' s 
Notice of Consideration For Summary Disposition pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(e) . Pe t i t ioners urge t h i s court to 
consider the i r Pe t i t ion for Review on i t s merits because the court 
has j u r i sd i c t i on to review the propriety of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Order Converting Ci ta t ion 
to Formal Adjudicative Proceeding ("Conversion Order").1 
1
 Two orders are currently at i s sue . Pet i t ioners are appealing the 
Department of Commerce's Order on Review, issued on June 27, 1994, and the 
underlying Conversion Order. They ac tua l ly seek jud ic ia l r e l i e f from the 
Conversion Order, and w i l l refer to the Conversion Order as the subject of the 
appeal throughout t h i s Memorandum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This court requested the parties to submit memoranda 
addressing whether it has jurisdiction to review the underlying 
order in this case because the order at first glance appears to 
lack finality as that term is applied in Barney v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 
1992) . The Barney court refused to review an administrative order 
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss because the order was not 
final. The petitioners in that case did not raise, nor did the 
court discuss, whether the order was final under the Collateral 
Order Doctrine. 
The Collateral Order Doctrine is a well established, practical 
construction of the final order rule that allows a court to review 
orders that finally determine important rights of a party when the 
issues are separate from the underlying action and would escape 
review if the court waits until the entire case is fully 
adjudicated. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337 U.S. 541, 
545, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 (1949). A court can review orders as 
final under the Doctrine if they: " [1] conclusively determine the 
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue [3] completely 
separate from the merits of the action, and [4] [are] effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982). 
In this case, Petitioners challenge a Division order, that 
converts a hearing for citations from an informal to a formal 
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proceeding.2 Conversion violates Petitioners' due process rights 
because the Division's own rule, see Utah Admin. Code R156-46b-
202(1) (m) (1994), designates citation hearings as informal.3 
Insofar as the Utah Administrative Procedures Act affords 
Petitioners a right to de novo district court review for informal 
agency proceedings, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1993) , but only 
provides for limited review of formal proceedings, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993), the Division's violation of its own rule 
deprives Petitioners of their right to a trial de novo in district 
court. Moreover, the Division's conversion establishes two 
procedurally distinct tracks for adjudicating citations. Since the 
Division's own rules have established citation hearings as informal 
proceedings, the conversion produces an inconsistent operation of 
the law, thereby depriving Petitioners of equal protection under 
the law. See Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). 
If Petitioners are forced to go forward with a formal hearing, 
they will participate in the very proceeding that violates their 
constitutional rights without ever having an opportunity to present 
2
 The Division purports to be acting pursuant to its authority under 
Utah Code 63-46b-4, which reads in pertinent part: 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any 
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may 
convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal 
adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative 
proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public 
interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly 
prejudice the rights of any party. 
3
 While the Division has provided the Director with discretion 
concerning the informal designation in other sections of Rule 156-46b-202, see. 
e.g. . id. at (q) , it has not provide the Director with the same discretion with 
respect to contested citation hearings. 
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their constitutional arguments to an appellate court. Accordingly, 
the Division's order to convert the proceedings is a final order 
under the Collateral Order Doctrine because it finally determines 
Petitioners' constitutional rights, which are entirely separate 
from the merits of the citations and which are unreviewable once 
Petitioners are forced to proceed formally. Therefore, this court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) (a) & 63-
46b-16 because the order that petitioners appeal is final. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On or about December 9, 1993, the Division issued 
citations to Merit Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc. and four 
employees (collectively referred to as "Petitioners") alleging that 
Merit hired unlicensed electricians to perform work in connection 
with a refinery modernization project owned by Kennecott Copper and 
that the named employees engaged in electrical contracting work 
without licenses or without exemption from licensure. 
2. Petitioners contest the citations because the electrical 
work at the site is exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(2) 
(1993), which exempts form licensure "construction and repair 
relating to . . . metal and coal mining." 
3. Division rules designate hearings for contested citations 
as informal and provide no discretion to the Division to change. 
See Utah Admin. Code R156-46b-202 (1) (m) . 
4. On April 5, 1994, the Presiding Officer issued the 
Conversion Order. 
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5. On May 5, 1994, Petitioners filed a Request for Review of 
the Conversion Order on the bases that, in light of the Division's 
own rule that designates citation hearings as informal, conversion 
to a formal proceeding: (i) violates Petitioners' right to due 
process insofar as the Conversion Order precludes de novo review by 
a district court and a hearing conducted under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and (ii) deprives Petitioners of equal protection because 
conversion produces an inconsistent operation of law, whereby 
Petitioners forfeit rights embodied in the informal process. See 
Memorandum in Support of Request for Review attached as Exhibit A; 
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay attached as Exhibit B. 
6. On June 27, 1994, the Executive Director of the 
Department of Commerce issued an Order on Review denying 
Petitioners' Request for Review of the Conversion Order and 
remanded the proceedings to the Division. 
7. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Utah 
Court of Appeals on July 27, 1994 initiating the instant appeal, 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE CONVERSION ORDER 
BECAUSE THE CONVERSION ORDER IS FINAL UNDER THE COLLATERAL 
ORDER DOCTRINE. 
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine Is A Practical Construction 
Of The Final Order Rule To Achieve Justice. 
This court has jurisdiction to review the Conversion Order 
under Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 828 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 1992), because the Collateral 
Order Doctrine is entirely consistent with the finality 
requirement. The Doctrine is an established principle of 
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jurisprudence that permits courts to review orders "which finally 
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.. 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 
1221 (1949). To qualify for review under the Doctrine, an order 
must: "[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] 
resolve an important issue [3] completely separate from the merits 
of the action, and [4] [be] effectively unreviewable on appeal from 
a final judgment." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102 
S.Ct. 2690. 
The United States Supreme Court first announced the Doctrine 
because it was faced with the finality requirement imposed by 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. In Cohen, the Court reviewed a district court order 
denying application of a state statute, which required shareholders 
bringing a derivative action to provide security for litigation 
costs. According to the Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 required that 
"[s]o long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, 
there may be no appeal." Id. at 546; Compare Barney. 828 P.2d at 
544 ("an order of [an] agency is not final so long as it reserves 
something for the agency for further decision."). Nonetheless, the 
Court refused to rigidly apply the finality requirement because 
once a final judgment on the merit is concluded, "it will be too 
late effectively to review the present order and the rights 
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conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, 
probably irreparably." Cohen. 457 U.S. at 546. 
After forty-five years, the Supreme Court still applies the 
Doctrine, "not as an exception to the 'final decision' rule, but as 
a 'practical construction' of it." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 
Direct. Inc. . 62 U.S.L.W. 4457, 4458 (U.S. June 6, 1994). 
Therefore, federal and state courts continue to review a 
"narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, 
but must, in the interest of 'achieving a healthy legal system,' 
nonetheless be treated as 'final'" Id. . 62 U.S.L.W. at 4458; see, 
e.g. . Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 11, 
103 S.Ct. 927 (1983) (district court order to stay respondent's 
action seeking order to compel arbitration was reviewable under the 
Doctrine); United States v. Deffenbauah Indus.. 957 F.2d 749 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (discovery order denying defendant access to grand jury 
record appealable under the Doctrine); In re Newport Savings and 
Loans Ass'n. 928 F.2d 472, 474-75 (1st Cir. 1991) (court reviewed 
the district court's refusal to grant "leave" to foreclose upon a 
mortgage, despite the fact that the forfeiture proceeding under the 
"drug money" statute was still in progress) ; R.W. v. Hampe. 626 
A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (order partially sealing the record 
in medical malpractice case reviewable under the Doctrine). 
Precisely the same judicial policies that underpin the 
Doctrine in other jurisdictions require application of the Doctrine 
to agency proceedings in Utah. Parties to agency proceedings have 
no explicit right to appeal important questions that will escape 
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review once a final decision on the merits is entered. Rule 18 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically precludes 
parties to an agency adjudication from seeking a discretionary 
appeal under Rule 5. Thus, while the Doctrine is unnecessary to 
protect important rights of civil litigants who have access to a 
discretionary appeal route, the Doctrine is the only means 
available to parties in an agency adjudication for securing 
judicial relief from rulings on important rights that escape review 
upon final judgment. See Tyler v. Department of Human Services. 
874 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1994) (Collateral Order Doctrine is not 
applicable when a party can seek discretionary appellate review 
pursuant to Rule 5). Accordingly, this court should not woodenly 
apply the finality doctrine, but rather should utilize the 
Collateral Order Doctrine as a means to effect justice in a manner 
consistent with the finality doctrine articulated in Barney. 
B. The Conversion Order Satisfies All Requirements 0£ The 
Collateral Order Doctrine. 
The Conversion Order is reviewable as a final order because 
it satisfies every requirement of the Collateral Order Doctrine. 
As noted above, an order is reviewable as final if it: 
(1) conclusively determines the disputed question; 
(2) resolves an important issue; 
(3) is completely separate from the merits of the action; and 
(4) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
decision on the merits. 
Nixon. 457 U.S. at 742. 
Application of requirements one and three to the instant case 
is unquestionable. The Conversion Order conclusively determines 
the question of whether Petitioners have a right to an informal 
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hearing in accordance with the Division's own rule, Utah Admin. 
Code R156-46b-202 (1) (m) , designating citation hearings as informal. 
Moreover, the constitutional issues at the heart of the question 
are completely separate from the merits of the citations. 
With respect to the second requirement, the Conversion Order 
conclusively resolves important constitutional issues. The 
Conversion Order deprives Petitioners of due process by removing 
them from an agency mandated forum that permits de novo review in 
district court as a matter of statutory right. See. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-15 (1993) . As a result, Petitioners are forced through a 
formal proceeding, which strips them of the right to seek review in 
the district court, and instead leaves them with a more limited 
review by appeal to this court. Id. at §63-46b-16; see Town of 
Chesapeake Beach v. Pessoa Const. Co., 625 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 
1993) (order denying stay of arbitration was important for purposes 
of the Doctrine because fl[i]f the parties are incorrectly forced 
into the wrong forum, the loss to each may be significant"). 
Moreover, the Division has deprived Petitioners of equal protection 
under the law because conversion to a formal proceeding, in the 
face of a rule designating citation hearings as informal, produces 
inconsistent operation of the law -- some parties to citation 
hearings receive fuller judicial review and others receive only 
limited review. Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). If 
this court refuses to review these issues, the Division becomes the 
de facto final arbiter of Petitioners' constitutional rights. Such 
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a result is entirely at odds with the proper role of an 
administrative agency. 
Finally, the Conversion Order meets the fourth requirement for 
application of the Doctrine -- that the decision be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a decision on the merits -- because 
once Petitioners enter the formal proceeding, their options for 
seeking judicial relief are fixed.4 The effect of the Conversion 
Order is to force Petitioners to contest the citations through a 
formal adjudicatory proceeding despite the Division's own rule that 
such hearings are designated as informal. See Utah Admin. Code 
R156-46b-202(1) (m) . Thus, without review by this court, the 
Petitioners will be forced to participate in the very proceeding 
from which they seek relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court has jurisdiction to 
review the Petition for Review on its merits and this Court should 
therefore order briefing of the issues underlying the Petition. 
DATED this Q day of September, 1994. 
JAMES B. H^ EE <7 
BARBARA -K. POLICH 
WILLIAM J. STILLING 
of and for 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
4This is particularly poignant because discretionary appeal through Rule 5 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is foreclosed- Thus, refusal by this Court 
to hear the Petition slams shut the only door open to Petitioners for appellate 
review. 
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I hereby certify that on this Q day of September, 
1994, I caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION to: 
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Utah Assistant Attorney General 
111 State Capitol 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
In the Matter of: 
MERIT ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMEN-
TATION, a corporation, and 
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH, 
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN, DAN 
A. JOHNSON, and KIT VANESS 
CARSON, individuals, 
Respondents. 
REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF ORDER 
CONVERTING CITATION TO 
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS DATED APRIL 5, 1994 
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841, 
1917, 1918 
and 1842 
(Consolidated) 
* * * * * * * * 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12, Respondents 
seek review of the Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudica-
tive Proceedings dated April 5, 1994, which Order was entered by 
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer. 
The Order is appealed on the grounds that: 1) the 
Division has no authority to convert a citation hearing to a 
formal proceeding because it has specifically classified 
contested citation hearings as informal proceedings; 2) even if 
the Division has authority to convert the proceedings, the 
criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) have not been met 
insofar as converting the proceeding on the above-referenced 
citations is not in the public interest and will cause unfair 
prejudice to the rights of Respondents; and 3) the Division's 
conversion order is an attempt to engage in impermissible 
rulemaking. 
A memorandum in support of this petition is filed 
contemporaneously with the filing of the petition and is 
incorporated herein. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 1994. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Barbara K. Polich 
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correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF ORDER 
CONVERTING CITATION TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS DATED 
APRIL 5, 1994, to: 
Robert K. Hunt 
Utah Assistant Attorney General 
111 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810 
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Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer 
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Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor 
Bureau of Investigations 
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
In the Matter of: 
MERIT ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMEN-
TATION, a corporation, and 
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH, 
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN, DAN 
A. JOHNSON, and KIT VANESS 
CARSON, individuals, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF 
ORDER CONVERTING CITATION 
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS 
Citation Nos. 1846, 1841 
1917, 1918 and 1842 
(Consolidated) 
* * * * * * * * 
This Memorandum is submitted in support of Respondents' 
petition for review of the April 5, 1994 order converting the 
hearing for the above-captioned citations to formal adjudication. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Presiding Officer in this case acted beyond his 
authority when he entered an Order Converting Citation to Formal 
Adjudication Proceedings ("Conversion Order") because the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 
(1993), does not authorize conversions in cases, such as this one, 
where the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("Division") has by rule specifically designated an adjudication as 
informal. Even if the Presiding Officer has discretion to convert 
designated hearings, his Conversion Order is invalid because 
conversion in this case does not satisfy the dual statutory 
requirements that the conversion must "be in the public interest" 
and that the conversion "does not unfairly prejudice the right of 
any party." Id. at (3). The Presiding Officer's claim that he 
requires more expansive procedures is not in the public interest, 
and is, in fact, contrary to the public interest. Moreover, the 
conversion unfairly deprives the Respondents of their due process 
rights to a hearing conducted under the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the conversion establishes 
a two track procedural system, and arbitrarily relegates 
Respondents to a track that treats them unfairly, thereby violating 
their rights to equal protection under the law. Erosion of due 
process and violation of equal protection not only prejudice 
Respondents specifically, but harm the public generally. Finally, 
the conversion to a formal proceeding in this case is simply a 
mechanism for converting the adjudication to de facto rulemaking. 
For each of the reasons, the Conversion Order must be reversed and 
Order For a Return to Informal Adjudication should be entered. 
PROCEDURAL SETTING 
On or about December 9, 1993, the Division issued 
citations to Merit Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc. ("Merit") 
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and four employees (collectively referred to hereinafter as 
"Respondents") alleging violations of the Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act. Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-1 et sea. (1993). The 
Division claims that Merit violated § 58-55-2(32)(c) of the Act by 
hiring unlicensed and non-exempt electricians as employees to 
perform electrical construction work in connection with a refinery 
modernization project owned by Kennecott Utah Copper, located near 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Division claims that each of the 
individual respondents violated § 58-55-2(32)(a) by engaging in a 
construction trade requiring a license (electrical) while not 
licensed or exempted from licensure. All respondents contest the 
citations because the electrical work at the site is "construction 
and repair relating to . . . metal and coal mining" and is 
therefore exempt from licensure under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-6(2) 
(1993). 
All respondents timely filed notice with the Division 
contesting the citations. Each respondent denied violating the Act 
and requested a hearing in accordance with the UAPA, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l, et seq.. and the applicable rules at Utah Admin. Code 
R156-46b-l, et seq. Despite the classification of hearings to 
contest citations as informal proceedings under R156-46b-202 (1) (m), 
the Division, on February 11, 1994, filed a Motion to Convert to 
Formal Adjudicative Proceedings ("Motion to Convert"). That same 
day, the Presiding Officer granted the Division's motion and issued 
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an Order Converting Citation to Formal Adjudicative Proceeding. 
Respondents timely filed an objection to the Division's motion and 
the Presiding Officer's order. In response, the presiding officer 
vacated his order on March 4, 1994. After both parties submitted 
further responsive pleadings, the Presiding Officer conducted a 
hearing on the Motion to Convert on March 28, 1994. On April 5, 
1994, the Presiding Officer issued a second Order Converting 
Citation to Formal Adjudication Proceeding ("Conversion Order"). 
A Notice of Hearing was issued by the Division the same day, which 
set the formal adjudication of the citations for May 25, 1994. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12, Respondents timely seek 
review of the Conversion Order and this Memorandum is in support of 
that Request for Review. 
Respondents incorporate all arguments presented to the 
Presiding Officer in prior pleadings and present new arguments as 
follows. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DIVISION HAS NO AUTHORITY TO CONVERT A CITATION 
HEARING TO A FORMAL PROCEEDING BECAUSE IT HAS 
SPECIFICALLY CLASSIFIED CONTESTED CITATION HEARINGS AS 
INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS. 
The Division cannot convert a proceeding, which it has 
specifically designated by rule as informal, to a formal hearing 
because it has no statutory or regulatory discretion to do so. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4, which the Division relies on to convert 
II; I i •>•! c i La L J,„on f 11"oc*•.'ediny s , pr ov i d e s i 
(1) The agency may, by rule, 
designate categories of adjudicative 
proceedings to be conducted 
informally according to the 
procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this 
chapter 
(2) Subject to the provisions of 
Subsection f 3), all agency 
proceedings not specifically 
designated as informal proceedings 
by the agency's rules shall be 
conducted formally in accordance 
with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order :i s 
issued in any adjudicative 
proceeding, the presiding officer 
may convert a formal adjudicative 
proceeding to an informal 
adjudicative proceeding, or an 
informal adjudicative proceeding to 
a formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion 
proceeding is in 
public interest; and 
(b) conversion 
proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the 
rights of any party. 
(emphasis added) v t.1 „solatic : subsectior tppears 
1 edin . ;ji „ 
sections are read as a whole, becomes apparent that subsection 
(3) serves solely modify default proceedings delineated In 
sub sect i on i, „ | , i 
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ciesj qnat i'M'1 hear ,i nqs, it would have made subsect T. ) 
"subject to the provisions ot Subsection { '\) , as h 
subsection . Cf. Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial 
Co mm ', r.zu y * * , ?*/ ^u^a. (concluding that 
omissior , : or- reference to a -
statute evidences legislative intent) . Si rice the Division by way 
»f Ru]e 156-46b-202(l)(m), has specifically designated contested 
c i t a t i o n h earings as in £ o i: m a ] a c:i j 1 i d i c a !::, I v e :> c e e d i n g s , t h e 
Presiding Officer acted beyond his authority converting the 
present adjudication to a formal proceeding. ?ee State ex rel. 
Department of community Affairs v. Utah M m it System. C o m icil , 6 ] 4 
P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980) (holding procedural rules "cannot be ignored 
or followed by the agency to su i t :i ts own purposes"). 
Legi s] atn i c i n Hiiarf i nq Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-£ " designate a proceeding as formal Informal, while 
providing * conversion only in subsection proceedings, Is 
apparent , M--,,.- a o n hcis, as noted 
previously, designated contested citato., hearings as informal. 
Utah Admin, R156-46b-202 (1) (m) Jowever -.:.' *. ,:i. merely 
designa* . .- citation hearings as nforma] * •• Divisic : ' . . . ed 
T + O experience with ci tati oi: i 1 le . - . ai 
109856 u 
nature of citation hearings,- *:\d. required by rule that evidentiary 
hear ings be cundurl:*- :.»•-. : - ions are contested Additi onal lyf 
wh lie the Division '..:• • provided the Director with discretion 
concerning the informal designation i n other sections of Rule 156-
e » g
 r :i d at (q) ,  i t has i i- : t pi: ov i < lie the Di rec itor 
with * . *- - :v t discretion with respect ' > contested ci tation 
hearings *-\H provision for evidentiary hearing demonstrates 
recugnlt i on 1 ' u 1.1 infnrmal heai ing Is no 
necessary, but is also sufficient to resolve contested citato . 
To allow the Division to arbitrarily change i ts mind ; 
(,)Hi i: 1:1 c u ,1 a r cas< «: a r e fu,1 ] y crafting the procedural 
requirements for contested citations woi '^  ni illifv the rulemaking 
embodied In Rti le 156-46b-202. 
The UAPA does not provide the Presiding Officer with 
authority to convert the nroceedings i n tl: le presen 
informal adjudication. Conversion Order is, therefore, 
invalid. 
Under the Construction Trades Licensing Act, the peculiar situation arises where the person cited 
has the burden to prove their innocence because a violation is presumed unless a citation is contested. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-55-13(4)(a)(i) (1993). The Division designated contested citation hearings as informal in light of this 
statutory framework. Therefore, a contested citation hearing is designed to protect the rights of the person cited, 
and has no public interest implication. To implicate public interest in a contested citation hearing would undermine 
the Respondents' opportunity to afford themselves the protections under the Division's rules. 
It is noteworthy that the division designated twenty procedures as informal under R156-46b-
202(1), but only required evidentiary hearings for two types of proceedings, one of which is a contested citation 
hearing. Obviously, the Division recognized that citations often present comphcated factual issues and mandated 
more rigorous procedures than are typically required for informal adjudications under the UAPA. 
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II. EVEN IF THE DIVISION HAS AUTHORITY TO CONVERT THE 
PROCEEDINGS, THIS CASE FAILS TO MEET THE STANDARDS SET 
FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46B-4(3). 
Even if the Divisic: ' * ;1 ' ' :'4 -*-: .vr-t the 
proceeding, onverting the kLtation hearing formal 
; . : • : . e 
public interest unfairly prejudices Respondents . :; *. . 
Utah Code Ann : 63-46b-4(3) provider : T \^ tne Presiding 
Of I: icei: may ("onvei:' an informal ad <i formal 
proceeding only if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is 
in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding 
does not unfairly prejudice the 
rights of any party. 
Despite the UAPA requirement that both conditions for conversion be 
ii'iei
 (l ir 1"i » Presiding Officer's decision to convert this hearing 
satisfies neither. The decision to convert is not in the public 
interest because a formal proceeding does not enhance the Presiding 
Officer's ability to decide the determinat ive Issues, Moreover, 
c o n ve r s I mi H p i ) n d e 111, s • :: f t h e 
substantive procedural rights embodied in a district court trial, 
and violates their right• ' > equal protection by depriving them of 
t. h•:•* s a n i e « r ' ",i f.a t i o11«»• > i r• t r, \ in,j I 1 y »is 
other similarly situated persons. Accordingly, the Presiding 
Officer's Conversion Order must be reversed. 
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A. THERE IS 10 BASIS TO CONVERT TO A FORKAL 
ADJUDICATION AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST. 
Contrary to the Presiding Officer's finding that a formal 
adjudication is necessary I ;» ssi n 
questio: adequate procedural mechanisms exis* anaer informal 
proceedings * < "-^T t hu Presidinc Cfficer __ gather facts 
r - - wi Il 'JM e 
According to the Presiding Officer, the public interest 
warrants a formal hearing because the issues surrounding the cita-
t:i 01 is 
are highly disputed in what may be a 
novel interpretation of the facts 
and law which may require the cross 
examination of witnesses and require 
submittal of rebuttal evidence in 
order to fully address the issues in 
the case, and may require the 
expertise of the contractors 
licensing board. 
( I L J. As explained belo^ * desired, 
additional procedural mechanisms are necessa: >r 
informal adjudication procedures, the UAPA provides an ample proce-
dural armamentarium for resolving whether • •* Respondents' 
s i nq /\rt, • 
The Presiding Officer already possesses significant and 
sufficient authority under the UAPA - .* gather the necessary 
*
,M
 ' " "" '
 J :
' •
 I,,ur.,ina 1 a d jud i< », 
unlik- - a jor i ty of informal adjudications 
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( - - J_ICJLL-L_ requires evidentiary hearings for 
contested citations. See Utah Admin, (Viae H J b r'i •• 4 tj L>—*1 iH i, "i | n. i t . 
Moreover.. •-..•-• -. explicitly provides parties to an informal 
ad judication hearir : •*-•• -. - ^  : \?u* ;'-- "testify, present evi dence, 
am I comment on • - (] )(c) 
(1993 Accordingly, parties can provide the Presiding Officer 
information at their disposal to advocate their 
P°:-
As the Presiding Officer noted i n his Conversion Order, 
factual determination *r *:u - matter involves "the relationship 
• 
vidence necessar} -„: v, Presiding Off.; -: o 
interpre* - \ - mining exemptic - -, ra- a* --*. § 58-^5-6(2) 
>arties 
themselves are T ... *JOS.\:. presen : * levant 
evidence pertaining • whether work at the site relates to mining. 
r i m e s ' abilitv ' Drovide a 11 relevant evidence, 
entirei nnecessary for - '}resj ding 01" t icer. to solicit 
evidence from outside sources through a formal procedure. If the 
Presidir fficer believe- - parties will inadequately 
y 
autho:; \ \ subpoenas : <r nei orders * compel production 
of necessary evidence. ' Id. at (e). • 
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K it is unnecessary for f" he parties to have the 
right to cr„.^ -examine witnesses as the l'"r cer cl a i :uts . 
Nothing in the procedures for an informal adjudication prevents the 
Presiding Officer from questioning the parties i f he feels the need 
to under*-' -1 ic:i 11 . ' ence moi:e f u 1 ] y Gi vei 1 the P i e s i.d iri g 
Officer's authority to question the parties, it i s 1: lard to imagine 
* - -v. Presiding Officer - ability s adjudicate the citations 
\. - . ^ i ies * t:o 
cross-examine witnesses . present rebuttal evidence, The light 
t r :ross-examination therefore superfluous for the purpose of 
< acts and 
accordingly public interest implication. 
Similarly lf Presiding Officer's claimed need for the 
e.xpeii t :i • • censing board can be adequately 
addressed through m f o r m a roceeding. The Iiirecluu, I the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing has authority 
t.i'i designate "an individual or body of individuals to conduct or to 
assist the director in conductinc 
cative proceeding."1"1 Utah Cjdt* *' ><•--.•*< i J ^ .\>.;-e 
director believes that 1 issues surrounding resolution 
""'" '" ""'" ' ijift i.equ i„,i e I he e,xp-- . •• ' -. • i , 
.2: designate that boarc tr assist is: Presiding Officer during 
informal adjudicative proceeding. In essence, the Board can 
, n c:ij" (,) f" f „i c e i C o n s e q 11 e 111, "I y , 
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a forma] proceed :i i 1 j offers absolutely no additional opportunity for 
the Presiding Officer to utili ze the expertise « 
Licensing Board. 
In ^residing Officer f c inherent fact 
gathering r>ov • * isi s as a matter « .' • • • " 
to convert * formal adjudication. Thus*, ailing *.;•-- ::.: 
requirement for conversion under the LA__, _..u Conversion Order 
B. CONVERTING TO A FORMAL ADJUDICATION IS 
IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46B-4(3) 
BECAUSE CONVERSION UNFAIRLY PREJUDICES THE 
RESPONDENTS' RIGHTS. 
Allowing the Division ? arbitrarily and capriciously 
otection and due 
process issues ,- instant case essence, *e Division has 
created two procedural tracks with different rights and 
protect i ons. The Dj_vj_s-[ori appears to have smyie -. ^ 
Respondents for a more costly and cumbersome track, whi 
less procedural protections. Conversion of the citation hearing 
an informal adjudical : • deprives Respondents' of their rights to 
a de novo . -.- • d! undtM \\w Mt.ili Huh.11 \\\ I1 ,M i dence ..uiid 
Rules r r: • ' rocedure, as embodied in I he informal scheme, 
1. Conversion Violates Respondents' Due Process Rights 
Conversi on 
because i t deprives then of procedural safeguards guaranteed under 
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UAPA and the Utah Administrative Code. Respondents' due process 
rights are implicated in this case because courts "first look to 
relevant statutes" to determine what protection due process 
requires in a particular case. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1169 (Utah 1988); see also State ex rel. Department of Community 
Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980) 
(holding procedural rules "cannot be ignored or followed by the 
agency to suit its own purposes"). 
The Utah Administrative Code provides that a "contested 
citation hearing held in accordance with subsection 58-55-13(4) "is 
classified as an informal adjudicative proceeding. Utah Admin. 
Rule 156-46b-202(l)(m) (1994). Parties seeking judicial relief 
from an informal proceeding have a right to a de novo trial in the 
district court governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1) (a) & (3)(b) (1993), which prohibit the use 
of hearsay and irrelevant evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 402 and 802. 
Conversion to a formal adjudication would deprive Respondents of 
their right to receive a hearing where hearsay and irrelevant 
evidence are excluded because, contrary to the Division's 
assertions otherwise, formal adjudications are not governed by the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. See Division's Response to Motion and 
Order at 4; Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Convert at 6-7. 
In fact, during a formal hearing, the UAPA explicitly 
permits the use of evidence which would be excluded under the Utah 
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Rules of Evidence. For example, the UAPA mandates that the 
"presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(1)(c) (1993). If the citation 
is adjudicated under formal proceedings, Respondents would acquire 
the right to cross-examine witnesses, but would be unable to 
effectively utilize their right because, by definition, hearsay 
evidence cannot be cross-examined. The procedural safeguard of 
cross-examination, which the Presiding Officer relied on so heavily 
in his Conversion Order, would offer Respondents no protection 
against hearsay evidence. In light of the fact that third parties 
can more easily intervene in a formal proceeding than under Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the inevitable intervention 
by groups not a party to the citation proceeding magnifies the 
Respondents' dilemma. Not only will they be faced with hearsay 
evidence that becomes part of the only factual record available for 
appellate review, but they must face the onslaught of such evidence 
from a multitude of intervenors who will attempt to flood the 
proceedings with evidence, hearsay and otherwise, to support their 
own agendas. 
In the same vein, irrelevant material may taint the 
record under a formal proceeding. While the "presiding officer may 
exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious," there is no mandate that he must do so. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(b)(i) (1993). Contrast the UAPA's permissive 
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language with the Utah Rules of Evidence: "Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. Like the problem 
with hearsay, intervention of outside parties amplifies the 
potential for introduction of irrelevant evidence. Not only will 
Respondents lose the right to exclude irrelevant evidence, but the 
expense they incur in trying to fend off such evidence from 
numerous parties will increase dramatically. Although an increase 
in defense costs alone might not amount to unfair prejudice of 
Respondents' rights, increased defense costs, in conjunction with 
deprivation of due process rights, certainly rises to the level of 
unfair prejudice. 
If Respondents have an opportunity to develop a new 
record before a trial court, the problems with hearsay and 
inadmissible evidence would evaporate. The de novo trial would be 
conducted under the Utah Rules of Evidence and a new record can be 
developed which is free from irrelevant evidence and hearsay. 
However, once a formal procedure occurs, the Division deprives 
Respondents of their opportunity to develop a new record. 
While a formal hearing may be a "trial-type" proceeding, 
see Kirk v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
815 P.2d 242, 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the due process protections 
afforded by the formal proceeding fall far short of those available 
in an actual de novo trial. The Presiding Officer's conversion 
will deprive Respondents of their due process rights and will 
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unfairly prejudice them. Accordingly, the Conversion Order should 
be reversed, 
2. Conversion Violates Respondents' Right to Equal 
Protection 
Conversion to a formal proceeding violates Respondents' 
rights to equal protection because it essentially establishes two 
tracks for adjudicating citations, an informal track by designation 
and a formal track by conversion. Each of these tracks affords 
Respondents with different procedural rights and safeguards from 
other persons within the same class (i.e., persons contesting 
citations). Because Respondents are members of a larger class, 
equal protection mandates that they be treated the same as all 
other members of the class. State Tax Comm'n v. Department of 
Finance, 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) ("Equal protection 
protects against discrimination within a class."). Because the 
Respondents have "been singled out from among a larger class" of 
persons contesting citations, the Division's imposition of a 
different set of procedures "must be considered to be arbitrary and 
constitutionally prohibited." Id. 
The Respondents do not argue that either the formal or 
informal proceedings are inherently defective. Rather, they are 
asserting that all persons similarly situated—anyone contesting 
citations—should be afforded the same procedural rights. Thus, 
once a particular proceeding is designated by rulemaking as 
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informal, the Respondents, as well as all other similarly situated 
persons contesting citations should be entitled to the rights 
embodied in that informal adjudicatory process. Any effort to 
deprive Respondents of those rights because they are working for a. 
large mining concern is particularly egregious. 
In State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that the State 
Tax Comm'n deprived the State Insurance Fund of equal protection 
because it imposed a tax upon the Fund that was not imposed upon 
private insurers. The Court ruled that the Fund and the private 
insurers all belonged to the same class, namely companies providing 
workmen's compensation. Therefore, the tax imposed solely upon the 
Fund was "arbitrary and constitutionally prohibited." Id. at 1298. 
Likewise, the Division in this case cannot arbitrarily 
modify its own regulatory scheme and convert to a formal hearing. 
To do so singles out Respondents, and deprives them of the right to 
avail themselves of the protections embodied in the UAPA and the 
Division's rules. The conversion to a formal proceeding deprives 
Respondents of equal protection and must therefore be reversed. 
III. THE DIVISION'S CONVERSION ORDER IS AN ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE 
IN RULEMAKING 
The Conversion Order is simply an effort to revive an 
unsuccessful attempt to make rules restricting the mining exemption 
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under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, On October 15, 
1993, the Division published a proposed rule that limited the 
meaning of "related to metal and coal mining"—the very terms that 
the Presiding Officer must apply to resolve the citations. See 
Utah State Bull. 93-20 at 8 (October 15, 1993). After a public 
hearing on the proposed rule, the Division abandoned the change 
because it concluded that the issue was best left to the 
Legislature. The conversion to a formal adjudication is an attempt 
to accomplish by adjudication, what the Division itself concluded 
could not be accomplished by rulemaking.3 
A formal citation proceeding, with the likelihood of 
intervention by a multitude of "interested" parties, would convert 
the evidentiary hearing into a public hearing more akin to the 
rulemaking process than adjudication. Moreover, third parties 
would infuse the hearings with broad policy concerns that are 
irrelevant to resolution of the citations. As noted above, if 
irrelevant evidence is admitted at the hearing, the Respondents 
have no opportunity to correct the record. 
The issue at hand for the Presiding Officer is whether 
the Respondents activities at the site were related to mining. The 
parties to this action are in the best position to provide evidence 
The Division's efforts to promulgate a rule that limited the definition of related to "metal and coal 
mining" severely taints its ability to impartially adjudicate the present case because it has essentially established its 
position on the determinative question in this case. 
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necessary to determine the relatedness of the refinery site to 
mining activities. There is no need for the Division to engage in 
de facto rulemaking to resolve the validity of the citations. The 
Conversion Order should be overturned to prevent the Presiding 
Officer not only from converting to a formal proceeding, but also 
to prevent him from converting an adjudication into de facto 
rulemaking. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondents request that 
the Conversion Order be reversed and that the Division enter an 
order setting a time for an informal hearing. 
DATED this 3 day of May, 1994. 
&^e- - £~?«L, {^ 
JAMES B. LEE 
BARBARA K. POLICH 
WILLIAM J. STILLING 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this S day of May, 1994, I 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
REVIEW OF ORDER CONVERTING CITATION TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS 
to: 
Robert K. Hunt 
Utah Assistant Attorney General 
111 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810 
and a copy to be hand delivered, in addition to the copy mailed, 
on the same date to: 
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer 
Bureau of Investigations 
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor 
Bureau of Investigations 
DOPL Construction Trades Licensing Section 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
)&rt^ L^ /Cf° ^ • t ; 
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TabC 
Darrel J. Bostwick (4543) 
Jeffery R. Price (6315) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
Fax: (801) 531-7060 
Armin J. Moeller, Jr. 
PHELPS DUNBAR 
Suite 500 - Security Centre North 
200 South Lamar Street 
P.O. Box 23066 
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 
Telephone: (601) 352-2500 
Fax: (601) 360-9777 
Attorneys for Respondents 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
MERIT ELECTRICAL & : 
INSTRUMENTATION, : 
a corporation, and JONATHAN : 
CARL JURETICH, CHRISTOPHER M. 
SCHIFFMAN, DAN A. JOHNSON, and : 
KIT VANESS CARSON, individuals, : 
Respondents. : 
OBJECTION TO MOTION AND 
ORDER CONVERTING CONTEST 
OF CITATIONS TO FORMAL 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
: Citation Nos. 1846, 1841 
: 1917, 1918 
: and 1842 
: (consolidated) 
Respondents, acting by and through their attorneys, hereby 
object to the Motion of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("the Division") to convert respondents' 
contest of the above-referenced citations to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding, and to the Order of the presiding officer granting that 
motion dated February 11, 1994, and hereby request a hearing of the 
Motion, Order and this Objection. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This matter arises from citations issued by the Division 
asserting violations of the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, 
Utah Code Annotated §58-55-1 et sea, ("the Act"). On or about 
December 9, 1993, the Division issued a citation to Merit Electric 
& Instrumentation ("Merit"), under Section 58-55-2(32)(c) of the 
Act claiming that Merit hired unlicensed and non-exempt electric-
ians as employees to perform electrical construction work in 
connection with the refinery modernization project owned by 
Kennecott Copper Corporation ("Kennecott"), located on Kennecott's 
property near Salt Lake City, Utah. On that same day, the Division 
issued citations to each of the individual respondents, asserting 
that each violated Section 58-55-2(32)(a) of the Act by engaging in 
a construction trade requiring trade licensure (electrical) while 
not licensed or exempted from licensure. 
Both Merit and its employees dispute the citations on the 
basis that such work and employment are exempted from licensure 
under Utah Code Annotated §58-55-6(2), Exemptions from Licensure. 
Merit and each of the individual respondents timely filed an 
appropriate notice with the Division contesting citations. Each 
(1) denied they violated the Act as asserted in the citations, and 
(2) requested a hearing in accordance with the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("the UAPA"), Utah Code Annotated §63-46(b)-l et 
2 
seq.. and the Rules applicable to the Division under the UAPA ("the 
Division Rules").1 
Rule 156-46b-4(2)(d) of the Division Rules specifically 
requires that any hearing held in conjunction with a challenge to 
a citation issued under the Act be heard at the Division level as 
an informal adjudicative proceeding. Under the UAPA, an agency may 
move to convert an informal proceeding to a formal proceeding in an 
appropriate case, but only where specific criteria are satisfied. 
On or about February 11, 1994, the Division moved the presiding 
officer to convert this matter to a formal proceeding under Utah 
Code Annotated §63-46b-4(c). That same day, the presiding officer 
granted that motion and by Order dated February 11, 1994, converted 
this matter to a formal adjudicative proceeding, subject to the 
objection of respondents being filed within 20 days following the 
date of the Order. The respondents object to the conversion to a 
formal proceeding, and this objection is timely filed. 
The basis for respondents' objection is that none of the 
required criteria have been met and, therefore, this matter is not 
an appropriate case for conversion. The conversion of this matter, 
if allowed, will substantially and irreparably prejudice the 
respondents and undermine their right to both procedural and 
substantive due process of law, and deny them the protections of 
the procedural requirements of the UAPA and the Division's own 
procedural rules. For the reasons set forth below, the respondents 
1
 The Division Rules relating to the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act are codified in the Utah Administrative Code §R156-
46b-l et seq. 
3 
object to the conversion of this matter from an informal proceeding 
to a formal proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
THE REQUISITES FOR CONVERSION TO A FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-46B-4(3) HAVE NOT IN FACT BEEN 
SATISFIED SO THAT CONVERSION IS NOT PERMITTED NOR JUSTIFIED IN THIS 
PARTICULAR MATTER. 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-4(3), the authority under which 
the presiding officer has ordered the conversion of this matter to 
a formal adjudicative proceeding requires the Division to show by 
substantial evidence that (a) the conversion is in the public 
interest, AND (b) that the conversion of the proceeding does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party. Without any hearing on 
the matter, the presiding officer made a ruling converting this 
matter which decision is not supported by any evidence of record 
nor any fact relevant to the resolution of the subject challenges 
to the citations on the refinery project. 
1. No Legitimate Public Interest will be Served by 
Conversion of this Matter to a Formal Adjudicative 
Proceeding. 
At issue in this case is the narrow question of whether 
Meritf s employees who do electrical trade work are required to be 
licensed by the Division prior to engaging in electrical 
construction work on the Kennecott refinery. The determination of 
that narrow legal issue depends only upon the application of the 
Utah Legislature's express exemption from licensure stated in Utah 
Code Annotated §58-55-6(2), of persons engaged in construction and 
repair work related to metal mining, to the electrical work at the 
4 
refinery project. This case turns solely upon determining whether 
the refinery is "related to" Kennecott's Utah metal mining 
operation as stated in the exemption. No person other than the 
respondents and Kennecott have any "legal interest" whatsoever in 
that determination. The mere curiosity regarding the resolution of 
this matter by other purely political or economic interest groups 
does not create an issue of public interest where none otherwise 
exists. 
Since the time the exemption was enacted in 1957, neither the 
Division nor any of its previous incarnations have required 
construction tradesmen working at the refinery to be trade licensed 
by the State of Utah. That history irrebuttably demonstrates that 
the public interest as expressed in the exemption has been served 
and satisfied at the refinery site for nearly 40 years. The public 
interest in this case requires and compels the,determination that 
the citations be withdrawn and the matter closed without any 
further proceedings. The Division has made no showing that any 
legitimate public interest is in issue in this matter, and there is 
no basis for converting this matter to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding. Therefore, the motion to convert should be denied. 
2. Conversion of this Proceeding Will Unfairly Prejudice the 
Rights of All Respondents. 
The respondents in this matter, Merit and its employees, are 
entitled to be treated like any other persons cited for violations 
of the Act. That is, they are entitled to contest the citations 
relating to the specific project, and have no obligation to fund or 
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participate in litigation not related to the specific issues raised 
in the citations. The Division's attempt to convert the proceeding 
from informal to formal is for the express purpose of allowing 
other parties to attempt to intervene and for the Division to 
obtain an advisory decision regarding the full scope and extent of 
the metal and coal mining exemption. The conversion of this matter 
to a formal adjudicative proceeding by the Division is designed and 
intended to expand the litigation to issues unrelated to the matter 
of Merit and its employees, and to provide a political arena where 
much broader and irrelevant questions relating to what the law 
should or should not be may be addressed by parties who are 
completely alien to this matter. Such a formal proceeding will 
degenerate to a debate on broad public policy topics which debate 
is only appropriate for the legislative process.2 These public 
2
 In 1993, the Division published proposed rule changes 
which attempted to narrow the statutory exemption for metal and 
coal mining. On October 28, 1993, a hearing was held before the 
Administrative Law Judge with regard to the proposed rule changes. 
As a result of the discussion at the hearing, as well as the advice 
of the Division's counsel, the proposed rule was withdrawn. At the 
hearing, it was represented to the Administrative Law Judge that 
the issue would be taken to the Utah legislature to attempt to 
modify or narrow the exemption by statute. However, with the 1994 
legislative general session just completed, there has been no 
proposed legislation enacted or even introduced regarding the metal 
and coal mining exemption from contractor or trade licensing. 
Despite the withdrawal of the proposed rule and the failure to 
introduce legislation regarding the exemption, the Division has 
issued the citations to Merit and its employees based upon a 
standard as stated in the aborted proposed rule; although that 
standard is completely different from the standard used for 
approximately 40 years with regard to the exemption. In other 
words, what the Division could not do or failed to do with the rule 
making process and legislative process with regard to the 
exemption, it has now chosen to do it be sheer force of 
Administrative fiat. Although the exemption has not changed for 
almost 40 years, the Division has chosen to enforce it in a 
6 
policy issues are irrelevant to the challenged citations at issue 
in this matter. The only relevant issue is whether the exemption 
covers Merit and its employees at the Kennecott refinery 
modernization project. 
The conversion of this matter to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding will require Merit and its employees to incur 
substantial expense in both time and money in order to contest the 
citations and to deal with massive amounts of irrelevant and 
inflammatory evidence relating to the political agenda of unions, 
trade associations or others, geared toward coercing Kennecott into 
an agreement to employ their members instead of the most effective 
and efficient contractors and employees on the various Kennecott 
projects. That prejudice to respondents will be both real and 
substantial. 
The clear reason behind the motion to convert, is the desire 
of the Division to provide a means whereby other parties might 
intervene in this matter in order to initiate a debate as to what 
the law ought to be relating to the application of the exemption, 
rather than what the law is and has been for nearly 40 years. The 
Division, by converting this matter to a formal proceeding, is 
intent on initiating what is nothing more than a de facto 
Declaratory Order proceeding which is binding upon respondents 
without regard to their consent to be subjected to such a 
proceeding. For, as the Division well knows, a ruling stemming 
completely different way than ever before, without following any 
rule making or legislative process to effect the change. 
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from a Declaratory Order proceeding is not binding on any 
interested party who does not consent to be bound by the ruling. 
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-21(3)(b). The Division is attempting 
to do by administrative fiat what it is, as a practical matter, 
unable to do under the UAPA, to the substantial detriment and 
prejudice of Merit and its employees. 
There is no showing by the Division that any other party has 
any legal interest in the outcome of the challenges to the 
citations, or that intervention is necessary or desirable for the 
resolution of the specific issue presented by the challenge to the 
citations. Because there is no basis or need for any third party 
to intervene in this matter, there is no reason to convert the 
matter from informal to formal.3 
Under the intervention provisions relating to formal 
adjudicative proceedings, only parties who can demonstrate that 
they have "legal rights or interests" in the matter may intervene 
and be heard on the record in the proceeding. Utah Code Annotated 
§63-46b-9(l)(c). Neither the Act, the UAPA nor the Division Rules 
define what constitutes a legal right or interest for purposes of 
determining the right of a third party to intervene in a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. However, the case law in Utah under Rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is both instructive and 
binding as to what showing is required before a party is entitled 
to intervene. For example, in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P. 2d 279, 
3
 Although the Division may want to avoid a de novo review by 
the Utah State District Court as provided under the Division Rules 
and the UAPA provisions governing informal proceedings. 
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(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court announced that "[t]o 
justify intervention, the party seeking intervention must 
demonstrate a direct interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation such that the intervener1s rights may be affected, for 
good or for ill." (emphasis added) More specifically, the Court 
stated: 
[The required] interest does not include a mere, 
consequential, remote or conjectural possibility of being in 
some manner affected by the result of the original action. It 
must be such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the 
action that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct 
operation of the judgment to be rendered. 
657 P.2d at (quoting State v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343, 346 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1963)(emphasis added). Since the decision in Lima, 
the Utah Court of Appeals has found that "the test normally applied 
to the right to intervene is whether the person seeking to 
intervene may gain or lose by a direct legal operation and the 
effect of the Judgment." Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 
797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990)(citing Commercial Block Realty v. 
USF&G, 28 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Utah 1934))(emphasis added). 
No other party has any legal right or interest which will be 
"directly affected" by a judgment in this matter. For example, no 
judgment to be rendered in this matter will create any entitlement 
by members of any union to be employed on the project. No judgment 
to be rendered in this matter will or can obligate Kennecott to 
contract with members of any particular trade association. Such 
groups have no direct legal interest or right which will in any way 
be directly enhanced or impaired by the outcome of this citation 
contest. The politically or ideologically driven beliefs of such 
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groups as to whether the refinery is "related to" Kennecott's metal 
mining operation are irrelevant to the resolution of this matter. 
No other party who would have any hope of proving a direct interest 
in the outcome of this case has identified itself or expressed any 
interest whatsoever in being involved. No showing of a need to 
provide a forum for qualified intervenors has been made by the 
Division. Therefore, a conversion to a formal proceeding is not 
warranted in this case and will materially prejudice the 
respondentsf rights to substantive and procedural due process 
otherwise provided for under the rules governing informal 
proceedings. 
In the order, the presiding officer seems to attach major 
significance to the fact that respondents have retained legal 
counsel to represent them in this matter. That fact is absolutely 
irrelevant and inappropriate to any decision or consideration of 
the conversion of this matter from an informal to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. Parties contesting citations under the 
Act are certainly entitled to have legal counsel represent them and 
cannot be prejudiced for having exercised their right to counsel. 
The criteria for determining whether conversion is warranted do not 
provide for consideration of whether any party has retained legal 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondents request that the matter 
be remanded for informal proceedings consistent with the UAPA and 
the Division Rules. Further, the respondents respectfully request 
10 
a hearing of the Divisionf s Motion and Order as well as this 
Objection. 
DATED this -* day of March, 1994. 
WALST 
Darrel J. feostwick 
Jeffery R.^Price 
Attorneys for Respondents 
OF COUNSEL: 
Armin J. Moeller, Jr. 
PHELPS DUNBAR 
Suite 500 - Security Centre North 
200 South Lamar Street 
P.O. Box 23066 
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 
Telephone: (601) 352-2500 
Fax: (601) 360-9777 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, Darrel J. Bostwick, hereby certify that on this -^ ^ ^ day 
of March, 1994, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of 
Object to Motion and Order Converting Contest of Citations to 
Formal Adjudicative Proceeding upon William S. Essex, Jr., 
Supervisor, Bureau of Investigations, DOPL Construction Trades 
Licensing Section by hand delivering same to his offices located at 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, Post Office Box 45805, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145-0805, and to Betsy L. Ross, Esquire, Utah 
11 
Assistant Attorney General, by mailing the same to her office 
located at State Office Building, #4120, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114. 
Darrel J A Boistwick 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
PREAMBLE 
A.rticle 
I. [LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT] 
H. [EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT] 
HI. [JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT] 
IV. [STATE AND TERRITORIAL RELATIONS] 
V. [AMENDMENT] 
VI. [MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS] 
VH. [ADOPTION] 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
PREAMBLE 
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America. 
ARTICLE I 
[LEGISLATIVE 
DEPARTMENT] 
Section Section 
1. [Legislative powers vested in Congress.] 6. [Compensation — Privileges — Holding 
2. [House of Representatives.] other office.] 
3. [Senate.] 7. [Bills and resolutions — Veto.] 
4. [Election of members — Sessions.] 8. [Powers of Congress.] 
5. [Organization — Proceedings — Adjourn- 9. [Powers denied Congress.] 
ment.] 10. [Powers denied the states.] 
Section 1. [Legislative powers vested in Congress.] 
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shal] consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 
Sec. 2. [House of Representatives.] 
[1.] The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen 
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each 
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numer-
ous Branch of the State Legislature. 
[2.] No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the 
Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of £he United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights. 
II. State Boundaries. 
III. Ordinance. 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage. 
V. Distribution of Powers. 
VI. Legislative Department. 
VII. Executive Department. 
VIII. Judicial Department. 
IX. Congessional and Legislative Apportionment. 
X. Education. 
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns. 
XII. Corporations. 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation. 
XIV. Public Debt. 
XV. Militia. 
XVI. Labor. 
XVII. Water Rights. 
XVHI. Forestry. 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions. 
XX. Public Lands. 
XXI. Salaries. 
XXII. Miscellaneous. 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision. 
XXIV. Schedule. 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people of Utah, in 
order to secure and perpetuate the principles of free government, do ordain 
and establish this CONSTITUTION. 
^OTES TO DECISIONS 
Cross-References. — Enabling Act permit-
ting adoption of Constitution, Enabling Act, 
§ 1 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Construction. 
—All language to be given effect. 
—Applicability of maxims. 
—Construction by legislature. 
—In light of circumstances surrounding origin. 
—Inclusion of Constitution in "law." 
—Intent. 
—Limitation of powers. 
—Prospective operation. 
—Provisos. 
—Same word used repeatedly. 
—-Substitution of one word for another. 
Definition of Constitution. 
Relation to state. 
Construction. 
—'All language to be given effect 
When possible, effect should be given to all 
of language used in constitutional provision. 
Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 112, 
263 P. 78 (1927). 
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene- mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake 
fits to private individuals; any benefits were City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
§§ 9 to 23. Key Numbers. — Franchises «=> 11. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 
Cosmetologists' license law. 
Criminal actions. 
—Investigations. 
—Prosecution. 
—Sentence. 
Criminal sentence. 
Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements. 
Property. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair Practices Act. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v. 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
i  26. 
classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
RE. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v. J.B. & RE. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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63-46b-4 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or 
other privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the 
agency may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to 
determine the award of that license or privilege. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-3, enacted by 
1987, ch. 161, § 259; 1988, ch. 72, § 16. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS notice or type of hearing at the beginning of a 
A i- ui i driver's license suspension hearing, when he 
Defect in notice w a s c^ear^v informed that the proceeding 
\ y a j v e r would be conducted informally, precluded him 
Dismissal. fr°m complaining, on appeal, that the original 
A .. h i i notice of hearing sent to him did not advise 
ThereferenceWto "applicable law" in Subsec- h i f whether the hearing was to be formal or 
tion (3)(a) is a reference to an agency's en- J ? * ™ ? - ? I n r l k eI h o fI v" Sdwendiman, 790 
abling statute as adopted by the legislature, R 2 d 5 8 7 < U t a h C t- APP- 1990>-
not an agency's rules as adopted by the agency. Dismissal 
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & _. ", ... . ,. ., , 
Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Dismissals without prejudice are authorized 
under Subsection (3)(d)(in). Doubletree, Inc. v. 
Defect in notice. Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. 
—Waiver. App. 1990). 
Motorist's failure to object to the manner of 
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as in-
formal — Standards — Undesignated proceed-
ings formal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceed-
ings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if: 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural 
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceed-
ings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will 
be enhanced by categorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential 
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's 
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, 
the presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an infor-
mal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a for-
mal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights 
of any party. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-16 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in Judicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, merit, effective April 23,1990, added the excep-
ch. 132, § 1. tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert. 
Final agency action. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Function of district court. The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
Right to judicial proceeding. delegated to the district court is to review in-
Cited, formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
Final agency action. 1990) 
Industrial Commission's determination of 
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not Right to judicial proceeding. 
reviewable under this section, because the District court erred in declining a de novo 
commission and the parties had not resolved review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci-
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale his application that was sufficiently judicial in 
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
App. 1992). agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear-
ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Pro-
Function of district court. fessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final ^pp. 1991). 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
the district court will no longer function as in- 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
termediate appellate court except to review in- State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct. 
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu- App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
309 
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(£) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). Agency action. 
Applicability of section. Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
Conflicting evidence. judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
Factual findings. deference an appellate court grants to an 
Final order. agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
Function of district court
 s h o u l d n o t ^ granted w n e n , although the 
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
 a g e n c y c o m m i t t e d e r r o r > t h e e r r o r w a s h a r m . 
Prior practice.
 l e g s M o r t o n lnt% I n c y U t a h g t a t e T a x 
Q?V1T'I <• Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statutory term. Arbitrary action. 
—Questions of law. Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
Substantial evidence test.
 t i o n a i disease disability benefits based upon a 
Substantial prejudice. solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
Whole record test. causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
^
l t e d
* the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
Agency action. of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
Whether the Industrial Commission acted fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsec- Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
tion (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Indus- 1991). 
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R156-46b-202. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(1) The following adjudicative proceedings initiated by a 
request for agency action are classified as informal adjudicative 
proceedings: 
(a) approval or denial of application to take a licensure 
examination; 
(b) disqualification of examination results for cheating on 
examination; 
(c) request for rescoring of examination; 
(d) approval of application for initial licensure, renewal or 
reinstatement of licensure, or relicensure; 
(e) denial of application for initial licensure or 
relicensure; 
(f) denial of application for reinstatement of licensure 
submitted pursuant to Subsection 58-1-308(6) (a); 
(g) denial of application for reinstatement of restricted, 
suspended, or probationary licensure during the term of the 
restriction, suspension, or probation; 
(h) determination of monetary limit under Section 58-55-21, in 
conjunction with approval of application for initial licensure or 
relicensure, or in conjunction with an application for increased 
monetary limit; 
(i) approval or denial of application for inactive or emeritus 
licensure status; 
(J) approval or denial of request to surrender licensure; 
(k) approval or denial of request for entry into diversion 
program under Section 58-1-404; 
(1) matters relating to diversion program; 
(m) contested citation hearing held in accordance with Subsec-
tion 58-55-13 (4) ; 
(n) board of appeal held in accordance with Subsection 
58-56-8(3); 
(o) approval or denial of request for modification of disci-
plinary order; 
(p) informal advice determining the applicability of statute, 
rule or order to specified circumstances; 
(q) declaratory order determining the applicability of stat-
ute, rule or order to specified circumstances, when determined by 
the director to be conducted as an informal adjudicative proceed-
ing; 
(r) approval or denial of request for correction of procedural 
or clerical mistakes; 
(s) approval or denial of request for correction of other than 
procedural or clerical mistakes; and 
(t) all other requests for agency action not specifically 
classified as formal adjudicative proceedings in Subsection 
R156-46b-201(l) . 
(2) A disciplinary proceeding initiated by a Notice of Agency 
Action issued pursuant to a Petition seeking exclusively the 
issuance of a private reprimand is classified as an informal 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of 
The Mead Corp. 
109622 
R156-46b-403. Evidentiary Hearings in Informal Adjudicative 
Proceedings. 
(1) Evidentiary hearings are not required for informal divi-
sion adjudicative proceedings unless required by statute or rule, 
or permitted by rule and requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided, a request for an evidentiary 
hearing permitted by rule must be submitted in writing no later 
than 20 days following the issuance of the notice of agency 
action if the proceeding was initiated by the division, or 
together with the request for agency action if the proceeding was 
not initiated by the division. 
(3) Evidentiary hearings are required for the following 
informal proceedings: 
(a) R156-46b-202(1) (m) , contested citation hearing held in 
accordance with Subsection 58-55-13(4); and 
(b) R156-46b-202(1)(n), board of appeal held in accordance 
with Subsection 58-56-8(3). 
(4) Evidentiary hearings are permitted for the following 
informal proceedings: 
(a) R156-46b-202(1)(b), disqualification of examination 
results for cheating upon an examination; 
(b) R156-46b-202(1)(1), matters relating to a diversion 
program; and 
(c) R156-46b-202(2)(a)(i), issuance of a private reprimand. 
(5) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, no evidentiary 
hearing shall be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding 
unless timely notice of the hearing has been served upon the 
parties as required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(d). Timely notice 
means service of a Notice of Hearing upon all parties not later 
than ten days prior to any scheduled evidentiary hearing. 
(6) Parties shall be permitted to testify, present evidence, 
and comment on the issues at an evidentiary hearing in a division 
informal adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of 
The Mead Corp, 
109622 
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R156-46b-202. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(1) The following adjudicative proceedings initiated by a 
request for agency action are classified as informal adjudicative 
proceedings: 
(a) approval or denial of application to take a licensure 
examination; 
(b) disqualification of examination results for cheating on 
examination; 
(c) request for rescoring of examination; 
(d) approval of application for initial licensure, renewal or 
reinstatement of licensure, or relicensure; 
(e) denial of application for initial licensure or relicensure; 
(f) denial of application for reinstatement of licensure 
submitted pursuant to Subsection 58-1-308(6) (a); 
(g) denial of application for reinstatement of restricted, 
suspended, or probationary licensure during the term of the 
restriction, suspension, or probation; 
(h) determination of monetary limit under Section 58-55-21, in 
conjunction with approval of application for initial licensure or 
relicensure, or in conjunction with an application for increased 
monetary limit; 
(i) approval or denial of application for inactive or emeritus 
licensure status; 
(j) approval or denial of claims against the Residence Lien 
Recovery Fund created under Title 38, Chapter 11, except those in 
which the claimant is precluded from obtaining the required civil 
judgment or administrative order against the original contractor 
involved in the claim because the original contractor filed 
bankruptcy; 
(k) approval or denial of request to surrender licensure; 
(1) approval or denial of request for entry into diversion 
program under Section 58-1-404; 
(m) matters relating to diversion program; 
(n) contested citation hearing held in accordance with Subsec-
tion 58-55-13 (4) ; 
(o) board of appeal held in accordance with Subsection 
58-56-8(3); 
(p) approval or denial of request for modification of disciplin-
ary order; 
(q) informal advice determining the applicability of statute, 
rule or order to specified circumstances; 
(r) declaratory order determining the applicability of statute, 
rule or order to specified circumstances, when determined by the 
director to be conducted as an informal adjudicative proceeding; 
(s) approval or denial of request for correction of procedural 
or clerical mistakes; 
(t) approval or denial of request for correction of other than 
procedural or clerical mistakes; and 
(u) all other requests for agency action not specifically 
classified as formal adjudicative proceedings in Subsection 
R156-46b-201(l). 
(2) A disciplinary proceeding initiated by a Notice of Agency 
Action issued pursuant to a Petition seeking exclusively the 
issuance of a private reprimand is classified as an informal 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The 
Mead Corp. 
R156-46b-403. Evidentiary Hearings in Informal Adjudicative 
Proceedings. 
(1) Evidentiary hearings are not required for informal division 
adjudicative proceedings unless required by statute or rule, or 
permitted by rule and requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided, a request for an evidentiary 
hearing permitted by rule must be submitted in writing no later 
than 20 days following the issuance of the notice of agency action 
if the proceeding was initiated by the division, or together with 
the request for agency action if the proceeding was not initiated 
by the division. 
(3) Evidentiary hearings are required for the following informal 
proceedings: 
(a) R156-46b-202(1) (n), contested citation hearing held in 
accordance with Subsection 58-55-13(4); and 
(b) R156-46b-202 (1) (o) , board of appeal held in accordance with 
Subsection 58-56-8(3). 
(4) Evidentiary hearings are permitted for the following 
informal proceedings: 
(a) R156-46b-202(1)(b), disqualification of examination results 
for cheating upon an examination; 
(b) R156-46b-202 (1) (m) , matters relating to a diversion program; 
and 
(c) R156-46b-202(2), issuance of a private reprimand. 
(5) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, no evidentiary 
hearing shall be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding unless 
timely notice of the hearing has been served upon the parties as 
required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(d). Timely notice means service 
of a Notice of Hearing upon all parties not later than ten days 
prior to any scheduled evidentiary hearing. 
(6) Parties shall be permitted to testify, present evidence, and 
comment on the issues at an evidentiary hearing in a division 
informal adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The 
Mead Corp. 
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CITATIONS ISSUED TO 
MERIT Electrical & 
Instrumentation, Inc. 
Jonathan Carl Juretich 
Christopher M. Schiffman 
Dan A. Johnson 
Kit Vaness Carson 
MOTION TO CONVERT TO 
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS 
CITATION NOS. 1986 
1841 
1917 
1918 
1842 
COMES NOW the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("Division") by and through William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor, 
Bureau of Investigations, Construction Trades Licensing Section, 
and requests pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, (1990 Replacement) 
("U.C.A."), § 63-46b-4(3), that the adjudicative proceeding 
initiated by the issuance of Citation Nos. 1986, 1841, 1917, 1918, 
and 1842 to MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl 
Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness 
Carson be converted to a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Citation No. 1986, 1841, 1917, 1918, and 1942 was issued to 
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl Juretich, 
Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness Carson on 
December 9, 1993. James W. Grant B. Antone Robinson, and Wayne J, 
Holman, Division Investigator, issued the citation pursuant to the 
authority granted in § 58-55-6((6). The citation was issued for an 
alleged violation of § 58-55-2(32)(a), U.C.A. 
Section 58-55-2(32)(a), U.C.A. provides that it is unlawful 
for any person to Engaged in or represented himself to be engaged 
in a construction trade or acted as or represented himself to be 
acting as a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure 
while not licensed or excepted from licensure. 
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl 
Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness 
Carson ("Respondents") submitted a Notice of Response to the 
Division on December 27, 1994 in which he denied committing the 
offense described in the citation and requested a hearing to 
contest the citation. 
"Respondents" base their denial of the charge on Section 58-
55-6(2) U.C.A., 1990 exempts from licensure"...any person engaged 
in...construction and repair relating to...metal and coal mining. 
Ruling on this point of law requires the expertise of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Contractors Licensing Board. 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY 
Subsection 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., permits agencies to designate 
categories of adjudicative proceedings by rule. Rule 156-46b-4, 
Utah Administrative Rules (1992), designates any hearing held in 
conjunction with a citation issued under Chapter 55, Title 58, 
Construction Trades Licensing Act as an informal adjudicative 
proceeding. 
Subsection 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. provides that any time before 
a final order is issued in an adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer may convert an informal adjudicative proceeding 
to a formal adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public 
interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly 
prejudice the rights of any party. 
Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(c) provides that in informal 
adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled to "testify, 
present evidence, and comment on the issues." 
Subsection 63-46b-8(l)(d) provides that in formal adjudicative 
proceedings, the parties are entitled to "present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examine, and submit rebuttal evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondents challenge the Division's issuance of the citations 
relevant to this processing and urge 58-55-6(2) U.C.A., 1990 
applies to exempt them from licensure that statute provides and 
exception for "...any person engaged in...construction and repair 
relating to...metal and coal mining." Any ruling on this legal 
argument requires the expertise of both the Administrative Law 
Judge, Contractors Licensinq Board and Electricians Board. 
It is further anticipated that both sides will call a number 
of witnesses and require the need to follow the formal process of 
direct and cross examination. A formal proceedings will also allow 
the intervention and presentation of evidence by other interested 
parties, 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY 
Subsection 63-46b04(l), U.C.A., permits agencies to designate 
categories of adjudicative proceedings by rule- Rule 156-46b-4. 
Conversion of the proceedings to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding is therefore permitted by Section 63-46b-4(3) and is 
appropriate given the circumstances present in this case. 
Wherefore the Division requests that its motion be granted 
unless the Respondent files an objection to the motion within 20 
days from the date of this motion and the objection shows good 
cause why the motion should not be granted. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
DATE: /*£/*«**€<- //, /4 9fy 
BY: /ft^ff,^—^^/! 
William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor 
Bureau of Investigations 
Construction Trades Licensing Section 
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805 
Telephone : (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CITATION ISSUED TO 
Merit Electrical & 
Instrumentation, Inc., 
Jonathan Carl Juretich, 
Christopher M. Schiffman, 
Dan A. Johnson, and 
Kit Vaness Carson 
(Respondent) 
ORDER CONVERTING CITATION 
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS 
CITATION NOS. 1846 
1841 
1917 
1918 
1842 
The Division in the above matter and prior to a hearing being 
conducted has by motion requested this matter be converted to 
formal adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3) of 
the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
The basis given for the motion is that the content and scope 
of the presentation anticipated in this case exceed the parameters 
considered when citations hearings were set as informal 
adjudicative proceedings and therefore the public interest, rights 
of the parties, issues and testimony involved in this case can be 
better protected and addressed in a formal adjudicative proceeding 
and that no party is prejudiced by the conversion. 
It is noted from the files on these matters an attorney has 
already made appearances in each of these matters and it appears 
the parties expect the proceedings to go beyond the limitations 
imposed by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(c). It also appears that no 
party will be prejudiced by conversion to a formal proceedings as 
no hearing or other proceedings has yet been held in this matter. 
ORDER 
Having found that conversion of this proceeding is in the 
public interest and does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any 
party and unless Respondents, within 20 days of the date of this 
order, files a written objection to the motion to convert to formal 
adjudicative proceedings, it is ordered that this matter is 
converted from informal adjudicative proceedings to formal 
adjudicative proceedings. This matter shall be rescheduled for 
hearing before the Contractors Licensing Board. 
The Respondents shall have 20 days from the date of this order 
to file a written objection to this order. If the Respondents so 
object this order shall be vacated and a new order will thereafter 
be issued determining whether or not conversion is appropriate in 
this case. 
Dated this fr ^ day of February 1994. 
^ ^ - ^ < r ^ f e ^ ^ — ^ 
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CONVERTING CITATIONS 
ISSUED TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS was sent first class 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc. 
Attn: Dave Roberts 
Richard Cloy 
17723 Airline Highway 
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769 
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc. 
Attn: Clint Cloy 
12000 West 2100 South 
P O Box 266 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire 
Phelps Dunbar 
P O Box 23066 
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 
Christopher M. Schiffman 
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc. 
12000 West 2100 South 
P O Box 266 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Jonathan Carl Juretich 
1081 East Saphire Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Dan A, Johnson 
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc. 
12000 West 2100 South 
P O Box 266 
Magna, Utah 84044 
James C. Cloy 
6500 South James Point Drive #3x 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Kit Vaness Carson 
3 53 South 1st West 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Darrell Bostwick 
254 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carol W. Inglesby 
Administrative Assistant 
Carol Inglesby, Administrative Assistant 
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805 
Telephone : (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CITATION ISSUED TO 
Merit Electrical & 
Instrumentation, Inc., 
Jonathan Carl Juretich, 
Christopher M. Schiffman, 
Dan A. Johnson, and 
Kit Vaness Carson 
(Respondent) 
ORDER VACATING CONVERSION OF 
CITATIONS TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
CITATION NOS. 1846 
1841 
1917 
1918 
1842 
The Division in the above matter and prior to a hearing being 
conducted by motion requested this matter be converted to formal 
adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3) of the 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
Pursuant to the Division's motion an order was signed granting 
the motion to convert proceeding on February 11, 1994. That order 
provided that if the Respondents filed a written objection to the 
motion to convert to formal adjudicative proceedings, the order 
would be vacated and a new order will thereafter be issued 
determining whether or not conversion is appropriate in this case. 
On the 3rd day of March 1994, the Respondents filed an 
objection to the motion to convert. 
The Respondent's have also requested a hearing on the 
Division's Motion to Convert and the Respondent's Objection 
thereto, 
ORDER 
Having found that the Respondents have filed a written 
objection to the motion to convert these proceedings to formal 
adjudicative proceedings as allowed by the prior order, it is 
ordered that the order of conversion of proceedings dated February 
11, 1994 is hereby vacated. 
This matter is hereby rescheduled for hearing on the Division 
Motion to Convert Proceedings and Respondents Objection thereto to 
be conducted on March 28, 1994 at 2:00 p.m. in Room 451 of the 
Heber Wells Building 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dated this day of March 1994. 
Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1994, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER VACATING CONVERSION OF 
CITATIONS TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc. 
Attn: Dave Roberts 
Richard Cloy 
17723 Airline Highway 
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769 
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc. 
Attn: Clint Cloy 
12000 West 2100 South 
P O Box 266 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire 
Phelps Dunbar 
P O Box 23066 
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066 
Christopher M. Schiffman 
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc. 
12000 West 2100 South 
P O Box 266 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Jonathan Carl Juretich 
1081 East Saphire Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Dan A. Johnson 
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc. 
12000 West 2100 South 
P O Box 266 
Magna, Utah 84044 
James C. Cloy 
6500 South James Point Drive #3x 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Kit Vaness Carson 
353 South 1st West 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Darrell Bostwick 
254 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carol W. Inglesby 
Administrative Assistant 
Carol Inglesby, Administrative Assistant 
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DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805 
Telephone : (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
CITATION ISSUED TO 
Merit Electrical & 
Instrumentation, Inc., 
Jonathan Carl Juretich, 
Christopher M. Schiffman, 
Dan A. Johnson, and 
Kit Vaness Carson 
(Respondent) 
ORDER CONVERTING CITATION 
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS 
CITATION NOS. 1846 
1841 
1917 
1918 
1842 
The above matters came on for hearing on the Division's motion 
to convert the above citation to formal adjudicative proceedings on 
March 28, 1994. The Presiding Officer being fully advised in the 
premises now enters the following Conclusions of Law and Order. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Jurisdiction. 
The Respondents in their objection to Motion and Order have 
alleged that upon entry of the order converting these matters to 
formal adjudicative proceedings entered on February 11, 1994, the 
presiding officer divested himself of any further jurisdiction in 
the matter until the ALJ remanded the matter as an informal 
hearing. 
1 
This argument is without merit. The February 11, 1994 order 
clearly retained jurisdiction if the order was objected to. 
Specifically, the applicable portion of the order reads as follows: 
The Respondents shall have 20 days from the date of this 
order to file a written objection to this order. If the 
Respondents so object this order shall be vacated and a new 
order will thereafter be issued determining whether or not 
conversion is appropriate in this case. 
Must Citation be heard as informal hearings. 
The Respondents claim that Utah Administrative Code Section 
R156-46b-4(2)(d) requires that citation hearings shall be conducted 
on an informal basis, and therefore the Division is violating its 
own rules in its motion to convert the matter to formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
This argument is without merit. The Division in designating 
citation hearings as informal adjudicative proceedings, did not 
eliminate the possibility that appropriate cases could be converted 
to formal adjudicative proceedings. To the contrary it is noted 
that the Divisions Bureau of Investigations, Policies and 
Procedures manual dated December 1, 1993 anticipated that such 
conversions to formal proceedings would occur in appropriate cases 
and included model forms drafted for the purposes of conversion of 
such cases to formal proceedings. It therefore appears this 
possibility of converting matters to formal proceedings was a 
factor in designating citations as informal procedures. 
Furthermore the Utah Administrative Procedures Act at Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-46b-4(3) clearly provides, "any11 informal 
proceeding may be converted to formal proceedings. 
2 
Criteria for Conversion. 
Having found that there is no prohibition against converting 
to formal proceedings and having found no specific Division rules 
on the criteria for conversion of such matters to formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the applicable requirements to support an 
order of conversion to formal procedures is found at Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-4(3) 
which requires that the conversion of the proceedings is in the 
public interest and conversion of the proceedings does not unfairly 
prejudice any party. 
Public Interest. 
The Division has cited the public interest in conversion of 
this case in that the proceeding to be conducted are highly 
disputed in what may be a novel interpretation of the facts and law 
which may require the cross examination of witnesses and require 
submittal of rebuttal evidence in order fully address the issues in 
the case, and may require the expertise of the contractors 
licensing board. 
I find the public interest has been sufficiently shown in 
these cases. 
Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(c) provides that in informal 
adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled to "testify, 
present evidence, and comment on the issues". 
This is compared to subsection 63-46b-8(1)(d) which provides 
that in formal adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled 
to "present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination and 
3 
submit rebuttal evidence". 
In most citation hearings, the limited scope of the hearing is 
sufficient to adequately address all issues that need to be 
presented to fully advise the presiding officer of the premises in 
the case. 
The wider scope of the formal proceeding is designed to assure 
the parties are given full and fair opportunity to present and 
argue their respective cases. This full opportunity to present the 
respective case in a formal proceeding appears to be the very 
reason that a trial de novo is allowed in an appeal to district 
court if the parties have only been accorded an informal hearing 
and not allowed if the parties have had a formal hearing. (To be 
addressed more later). 
The Respondents have argued that the sole issue in this case 
is a matter of law and therefore there are no factual issues and 
therefore cross examination is not needed and therefore an informal 
hearing can resolve the matter. 
This argument is without merit. 
The parties are disputing whether the work that was the basis 
for the citation is included in the exemption allowed under Utah 
Code Annotated section 58-55-6-(2) for construction and operation 
incidental to metal or coal mining. The parties dispute whether 
the construction of a refinery operation is sufficiently related to 
"mining" to allow the exemption in these cases. 
Black's law dictionary defines mining as, "The process or 
business of extracting from the earth the precious or valuable 
4 
metals, either in their native state or in their ores." 
It would appear from the plain language of the exemption may 
not include refining ore which would not be done at the mine site 
itself where the "extracting from the earth" occurs• The extent of 
how far the language "incidental to" goes is a mixed question of 
law and fact. 
It is inconceivable, as a presiding officer, that I can decide 
this issue without receiving factual testimony of what is the 
relationship of the mine site to the refinery site. It is equally 
apparent to me that in order to have this issue adequately 
addressed that any such testimony of how closely related these 
activities are should be subject to cross examination by the other 
parties in order to fully evaluate this case. 
Therefore I find that conversion to formal proceedings is 
necessary to the proper resolution of the matter. It would be a 
needless waste of the resources of both parties to force the 
parties to conduct an informal hearing when a formal hearing is 
necessary to fully resolve the issues. It appears that forcing the 
parties to participate in an informal hearing in such a case, no 
matter which party prevailed, would only force an appeal so that 
the parties could fully present their case in a formal setting. It 
is in the public interest for appropriate cases to be resolved with 
full presentation of the case to avoid unnecessary waste of 
resources and to have the matter adequately addressed at the first 
hearing of the matter. 
5 
No unfair prejudice to any party. 
The Respondents have alleged that they will be denied their 
right to trial de novo at district court if the matter is converted 
to an formal proceedings and is therefore prejudicial and therefore 
conversion is not allowed. 
This argument is without merit. 
The import of the trial de novo is that a party at some stage 
must be given the full opportunity to present its case with all the 
appropriate protections and rights accorded a formal hearing. 
The fact that conversion to formal proceedings may change the 
rights on appeal at district court is not dispositive. If it were, 
any conversion to formal proceedings would be impossible. Since 
conversion is clearly allowed, this right to trial de novo cannot 
be the deciding factor of whether or not to order the conversion. 
The only prejudicial effect that I can find presented by these 
matters, of whether an a order should be issued converting the 
matters to formal proceedings, is that the parties right to fully 
present the case in these matters may prejudiced in an informal 
setting because of the limitation of the informal hearing and 
therefore find that these matters must be converted in to formal 
proceedings in order to adequately address the issue at hand. 
It is difficult to find a situation where being accorded the 
full scope of a hearing to the parties in a formal proceeding could 
be prejudicial to the presentation of their case. 
It is noted that the motion for conversion was made prior to 
any hearing on these citations. The Respondents have not been 
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prejudiced by preparing for hearing in one setting and then being 
required to hear the matter in another setting. 
The Respondent have claimed that defending the actions in a 
formal hearing will cost them more in defense costs and time and 
therefore is prejudicial to them and therefore should not be 
converted. Again if this were the deciding criteria no cases could 
be converted to formal proceedings, in that the formal proceedings 
by nature of the allowed presentation will take more time. 
Therefore, this factor alone is not "unfairly" prejudicial to the 
party. 
Finally, the Respondents have claimed that there may be 
improper motives behind these citations or other improper actions 
may happen in a formal proceeding preceding that should not be 
allowed to happen. 
I can find no merit to this argument. Quite to the contrary, 
if improprieties are at issue in this case it would only further 
heighten the need that these matters be held in a setting which can 
adequately address and rule upon such allegations. I can find no 
basis whatsoever to conclude that any motions or proceedings that 
would be conducted on a formal basis would not be handled according 
to applicable law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case began with issuance of the above-enumerated citations by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL") of the Department of Commerce. 
Respondents requested a hearing to contest the citations. Pursuant to Department Rule 156-46b-
202(m), hearings in citation cases are designated as informal under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. However, on motion of DOPL, the hearing officer converted the proceedings 
to formal (the "Conversion Order"), and it is that conversion that Respondents contest. 
Respondents filed a request for review with the Executive Director of the Department, requesting 
that the Conversion Order be reversed and that the Division enter an order setting an informal 
hearing. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive Director of the Department 
of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-13 of the Rules 
of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Respondents raise the following issues: 
a. The Division has no authority to convert proceedings from informal to formal; 
b. Even if it does, conversion here is improper under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-4(3) 
because conversion is not in the public interest and will cause unfair prejudice to 
Respondents; and 
c. The Conversion Order is an impermissible attempt at rulemaking. 
2. Initially, however, the issue to be addressed is whether the Conversion Order is 
reviewable by the Executive Director. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
No evidence has yet been presented to establish any of the factual allegations relevant to 
the citation in this proceeding. However, the procedural history of this case can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. On or about December 9, 1993, DOPL issued citations to Merit Electrical & 
Instrumentation, Inc. ("Merit") and four of its employees alleging violations of the Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act (Utah Code Ann. Title 58, Chapter 55). The citations are 
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based on allegations that Merit unlawfully employed electricians who were unlicensed and not 
exempt from licensure under the Act. 
2. The citations were consolidated into one proceeding. Pursuant to a request by 
DOPL, and following briefing by the parties, the hearing officer issued the Conversion Order 
dated April 5, 1994. Respondents filed a Request for Reconsideration. They also filed a Request 
for Review with the executive director. Both parties have thoroughly briefed the issue in various 
memoranda in support. The hearing, previously scheduled to be conducted before the 
Contractors' Licensing Board, has been continued without date pending completion of this 
review. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 63-46b-14(l) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
Title 63, Chapter 46b ("UAPA") allows a party to seek judicial review of "final agency action". 
The finality requirement applies to agency action taken in either informal or formal proceedings. 
2. UAPA is silent, however as to whether interim orders entered in proceedings 
before a division are subject to agency review by the head of the department. Clearly, an order 
is not "final" - for purposes of judicial review — if it reserves something to the agency for 
further decision. See Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P. 2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion in Eliason v. Buhler, 
et al (Case No. 900518, December 5, 1990) (copy attached). In that case, the executive director 
of the Department of Commerce had issued an order on review prior to the conclusion of an 
administrative proceeding. However, the court stated that: 
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Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 (1989) permits further administrative review of an 
administrative law judge's order only "|j|f a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek [such] review." 
The Court ordered the executive director of the Department of Commerce to vacate an 
order on review because he had no authority to review an interim order. 
The statute on which the Court relied in the Eliason case, §13-1-12, has since been 
repealed. That statute had permitted an appeal to the executive director "at the close of an 
adjudicative proceeding". Section 13-1-8.5 generally applies to all departmental adjudicative 
proceedings and thus requires the department to follow the UAPA. Section 63-46b-12 of the 
UAPA provides that a party may file a request for review if permitted to do so by any statute or 
rule. No statute exists which authorizes agency review of interim orders. Further, departmental 
rules which govern agency review are silent as to whether any such review is permitted. 
5. Section 58-1-109, addressing administrative proceedings before DOPL, expressly 
provides: 
The final order of the director [or his designee] may be appealed by filing 
a request for agency review with the executive director or his designee within the 
department. 
(§58-l-109(8))(Emphasis added) 
Section §58-1-109 limits agency review to final orders. The Conversion Order is not a 
final order. Thus, no proper legal basis exists to conduct agency review of that order during the 
pendency of proceedings before the Division. 
7. Because of this ruling, I am not considering the issues raised by Respondents. 
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ORDER 
Respondents' request for review of the Conversion Order is denied and this case is 
remanded to the Division for further proceedings. 
Dated thisc^/dav of June, 1994 
CfottJkcn^-
Constance B. White, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order, if it is available, may be sought by filing a Petition for 
Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition for such Review 
shall comply with the requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
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ORIENTATION AND REFERENCE MANUAL 
for 
PROFESSIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARD MEMBERS 
Introduction 
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing is an 
agency within the Department of Commerce and is charged with 
licensing and regulating persons engaged in specific occupations 
and professions designated by the legislature. 
There is established for most of the regulated occupations and 
professions, a Board or Committee to act, advise and otherwise 
assist the Division in regulation of the specific occupation or 
profession. 
This Orientation and Reference Manual has been prepared to assist 
new Board members to come to an understanding of their role as a 
Board member, of the role of the Board, of the role of the 
Division, of the method by which licensure is approved or denied, 
and of the manner by which disciplinary action is taken against 
the license of a person who acts unlawfully or unprofessionally. 
Organization 
The Department of Commerce is managed by an Executive Director 
who is appointed by the Governor, and who serves as a member of 
the Governor's cabinet. 
Within the Department are the Divisions of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Public Utilities, Corporations, 
Securities, Real Estate, Consumer Protection, and the Committee 
of Consumer Services. 
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, with 
which Board members will now have a close association, is managed 
by a Director who is appointed by the Executive Director with the 
approval of the Governor. 
The Division has within it the following major "working groups" 
into which fall its various duties and responsibilities: 
1. Bureaus of Health Professions Licensing I and II; 
2. Bureau of Occupations and Professions Licensing; 
3. Bureau of Construction Trades Licensing; 
4. Bureau of Financial Audit 
5. Bureau of Investigations; 
6. Medical Malpractice Prelitigation Section; and 
7. Administration. 
Action of the Legislature has caused over forty (40) occupations or 
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professions including over sixty (60) primary license 
classifications to be under the responsibility of the Division 
The Division is assisted in the licensing and regulation of persons 
in these specific classifications by over forty (40) Boards. Each 
Board is assigned by the Division Director to a Bureau Manager for 
the purposes of administration. 
Board Appointments 
Members of the Boards are appointed by the Executive Director of 
the Department of Commerce after their selection has been confirmed 
by the Governor. 
Appointments are made from nominations made by associations or 
groups representing regulated classifications, by individuals who 
have an interest in regulation of the classification, by the Boards 
themselves, or from other credible and responsible sources. 
Boards are generally made up of five (5) members of whom four (4) 
are persons licensed in the regulated classification, and one (1) 
is a lay member from the public. There are a few boards which have 
greater numbers such as the Board of nursing which is made up of 
thirteen (13) numbers, and the Physicians Licensing Board which is 
made up of seven (7) members. In all cases there is at least one 
member who is a lay member from the public. 
Appointments are generally for a term of five (5) years. There are 
some "interim" appointments necessary when a Board member is not 
able to continue service and a replacement must be named. In those 
cases, the appointment will be for the remaining unexpired portion 
of the original appointee's term. 
A Board member may serve two consecutive terms; but, may not serve 
more than two consecutive terms. A member who has once served two 
consecutive terms may be reconsidered for appointment again after 
an absence from board service for a minimum of two years. 
Duties and Responsibilities of the Board 
The Board is a vital part of the process of licensure and 
regulation. Contained within the Board are those who have the 
vital and necessary knowledge to make informed decisions particular 
to a specific occupation or profession. The public member of the 
Board has the unique responsibility to be the most pronounced voice 
in the public interest. The Division cannot function effectively 
in the public interest without the advice and counsel of its 
Boards. 
The statute has generally defined the duties, functions and 
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responsibilities of the Boards under the "Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing Act". This is found in Chapter 1 of 
Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, and is commonly referred to by the 
Division and the Boards as the "umbrella chapter". The Board 
duties are primarily contained in Section 8 of Chapter 1, as 
follows: 
58-1-202. Boards - Duties, functions, and 
responsibilities• 
The duties, functions and responsibilities of each 
board include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) recommending to the director appropriate rules; 
(2) recommending to the director policy and budgetary 
matters; 
(3) approving and establishing a passing score for 
applicant examinations; 
(4) screening applicants and recommending licensing 
renewals reinstatement, and relicensure actions 
to the director in writing; 
(5) assisting the director in establishing standards 
of supervision for students or persons in 
training to become qualified to obtain a license 
in the occupation or profession it represents; 
and 
(6) acting as presiding officer in conducting 
hearings associated with adjudicative proceedings 
and in issuing recommended orders when so 
designated by the director. 
There is set forth in another section, certain duties and 
responsibilities of the Division which are to be carried out in 
collaboration with the Board. They are contained in Section 9 of 
Chapter 1, as follows: 
58-1*203. Duties, functions, and responsibilities of 
division in collaboration with board. 
(1) defining which schools, colleges, universities, 
departments of universities, or other 
institutions of learning are reputable and in 
good standing; 
(2) prescribing license qualifications; 
(3) prescribing rules governing applications for 
licenses; 
(4) providing for a fair and impartial method of 
examination of applicants; 
(5) defining unprofessional conduct, by rule, to 
supplement the definitions under this chapter or 
other licensing chapters; 
(6) establishing advisory peer committees to the 
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board and prescribing their scope of authority; 
and 
(7) establishing conditions for reinstatement and 
renewal of licenses. 
Please note, this statute assigns these duties and responsibilities 
to the Division; but, directs that the Division shall collaborate 
with the Board in making its decision and in taking action. 
Duties and Responsibilities of the Division - Contrast With Duties 
and Responsibilities of the Board 
The duties and responsibilities specifically assigned to the 
Division as they are set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 58, the 
"umbrella chapter" are as follows: 
58-1-106. Division - Duties, functions, and 
responsibilities• 
The duties, functions and responsibilities of the 
division include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) prescribing, adopting, and enforcing rules 
to administer this title; 
(2) investigating the activities of any person 
governed by the laws and rules administered and 
enforced by the division; 
(3) subpoenaing witnesses, taking evidence and 
requiring by subpoena duces tecum the production 
of any books, papers, documents, records, 
contracts, recordings, tapes, correspondence, or 
information relevant to an investigation upon a 
finding of sufficient need by the director; 
(4) taking administrative and judicial action 
against persons in violation of the laws and 
rules administered and enforced by the division, 
including, but not limited to, the issuance of 
cease and desist orders; 
(5) seeking injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders to restrain unauthorized activity; 
(6) giving public notice of board meetings; 
(7) keeping records of board meetings, proceedings, 
and actions and making those records available 
for public inspection upon request; 
(8) issuing, refusing to issue, revoking, 
suspending, renewing, refusing to renew, or 
otherwise acting upon any license or licensee; 
(9) preparing and submitting to the governor and the 
Legislature an annual report of the divisions 
operations, activities, and goals; 
(10) preparing and submitting to the executive 
director of the department a budget of the 
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expenses for the division; 
(11) establishing the time and place for the 
administration of examinations; and 
(12) preparing lists of licensees and making these 
lists available to the public at cost upon 
request unless otherwise prohibited by state or 
federal law. 
A comparison of the duties and responsibilities of the Division and 
the duties and responsibilities of the Board generally establishes 
the Board in an advisory, recommending, and assisting role 
supporting the Division in taking appropriate action. Development 
of a positive relationship in the public interest between the 
Division and Boards requires an understanding of the respective 
roles assigned by the Legislature, and respect for the integrity 
and intent of each body by the other. 
Board Meetings 
Board meetings for many Boards are held once each month. For some 
Boards who do not have an influx of new applicants for licensure or 
other necessary business, the meetings may be held on a quarterly 
basis, and rarely on a semi-annual or annual basis. 
Monthly meetings are usually scheduled on the same day of each 
month to permit all Board members to plan their schedules. 
Meetings are held in the Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah and are normally held in one of the 
conference rooms on the fourth floor. The specific room number is 
normally included in an advance mailing of the Agenda for the 
meeting and is also posted on the day of the meeting in the lobby 
on the 4th floor immediately adjacent to the elevator. 
Parking is available in the covered parking garage on the north 
side of Third South, directly across from the Heber M. Wells 
Building. Reimbursement for parking is $3.00 each meeting day. 
The agenda for a meeting is usually established by the Board 
Secretary in consultation with the Board Chairman and the Bureau 
Manager responsible for the particular occupation or profession. 
Any Board member can request that an item be placed on the agenda 
by simply contacting the Board Secretary who will then coordinate 
it with others as necessary. 
Board meetings for most Boards are concluded within four hours; 
however, some Boards meet for a full day to complete their monthly 
business. 
If a Hearing is held on the day of a Board Meeting to either 
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consider pending rules or to consider a disciplinary matter before 
the Board# the meeting may require a "long full day". Rarely a 
disciplinary Hearing is complex enough that it will extend for more 
than one day. In those cases, the Administrative Law Judge who 
will preside at the Hearing will contact each Board member in his 
preparation of a Scheduling Order to facilitate the matter being 
heard in its entirety before the maximum number of Board members. 
A quorum present at a meeting is necessary for the Board to conduct 
business. A quorum is a simple majority of the Board members who 
have been appointed to the Board. If a Board meeting is scheduled 
and a quorum does not appear, business cannot be conducted and the 
time of those who did appear is wasted. Each Board member's 
attendance is valuable and demonstrates a courtesy to other 
members. 
Meetings of a Board are generally open to the public. Meetings can 
be closed however upon a finding that there exists one of the 
following reasons to close a meeting: 
(1) discussion of the character, professional competence, 
or physical or mental health of an individual; 
(2) strategy sessions with respect to collective 
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property; 
(3) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel 
or devices; and 
(4) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of 
criminal misconduct. 
To close a meeting, there must first be a quorum present to conduct 
business, and two-thirds of those present must vote to close the 
meeting. The reason for holding a closed meeting and the vote of 
each member of the Board shall be recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting. 
Notice of meetings of the Board are required and the Division 
facilitates the appropriate and required notice. It is unlawful to 
hold a meeting of the Board without notice or without compliance 
with the provisions under which an emergency meeting may be held. 
Accordingly, it is important that Board members do not arrange to 
hold a meeting of the Board, or any meeting which could be 
interpreted to be a meeting of the Board, without total compliance 
with the Open and Public Meeting Act, Chapter 4, Title 52. 
Each Board is assigned to a Bureau Manager who supervises an 
individual who acts as the Board Secretary. The Board Secretary 
records, transcribes, and presents for approval of the Board, 
minutes of each Board meeting. The Board Secretary is also charged 
with knowing the statute and rules concerning the particular 
profession/occupation, the policies and procedures by which 
applications are handled in the division, and the action 
alternatives which the Board may consider during its meetings. The 
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Board Secretary is a vital resource and aid to the Board and should 
become the Board's "right hand". 
Conflicts of Interest 
The ability of persons to serve on a Board is enabled by their 
personal integrity and their ability to fairly and honestly deal 
with issues which come before them. 
It is important that Board members avoid involvement in anything 
which may compromise their ability to fulfill their Board 
responsibilities• 
Certainly Board members will be expected to be informed about the 
profession or occupation they are called upon to regulate. They 
will have contact with persons who are regulated and persons who 
are served by those regulated. Some will appropriately try to 
influence Board members' decisions. That is expected and Board 
members will want to listen carefully to the positions put forward 
in order to consider all sides of an issue. 
There are some attempts at influence or pressure which are not 
appropriate and may well be unlawful. If a Board member 
experiences such an attempt, or has questions about the 
appropriateness of any contact, he or she should immediately 
consult the Bureau Manager to whom the Board has been assigned, or 
the Division Director and discuss with him or her the 
circumstances. If the advice of others is needed, the Manager or 
Director will arrange for such advice. 
If Board members are involved in discussion of, voting upon, or 
otherwise acting as Board members on any issue in which they may 
have a conflict of interest, they should make that conflict known 
to the person presiding. If it is in a Board meeting, they should 
declare the conflict to the Chairman of the Board to permit 
appropriate advice and counsel to them and to the rest of the 
Board. If the conflict arises in an Administrative Hearing, they 
should declare the conflict to the Administrative Law Judge to 
permit a ruling as to whether they can participate in the 
proceeding. 
It is possible that failure of a Board member to declare a conflict 
may result in subsequent discovery of the conflict and an 
invalidation of action taken by the Board. While that is certainly 
serious, the more serious consequence is that the member's actions 
may have compromised the fair and equitable handling of an issue 
before the Boarc to the detriment of an applicant for license or a 
licensee. 
It is unfair for individual Board members to represent to anyone 
what the position of the Board might be on a certain issue if the 
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Board has not taken a position on that issue in a formal meeting of 
the Board. Such a statement of position may well mislead a person 
who relies upon that position and later finds out the Board's 
actual position is entirely different. Each Board member must 
respect the potential position of all Board members and let the 
business of the Board and its decisions be represented by action 
taken in formal meetings of the Board. 
Laws 
There are two basic types of laws with which the Boards and 
Division deal in the licensing and regulation of designated 
occupations or professions. 
The first are statutes. Statutes are laws which are passed by the 
Utah State Legislature. The primary statutes with which Board 
members deal are as follows: 
1. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
Act, Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated; 
2. Occupation/Profession Specific Licensing Act, a 
specific Chapter, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated; 
3. Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Chapter 46a, 
Title 63, Utah Code Annotated; and 
4. Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 46b, Title 63, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
In order for there to be a change in statutes, the Legislature must 
act by passing a new statute or by amending the existing statute. 
That means that a statute can only be changed while the legislature 
is in session. 
The second type of law are rules. Rules are adopted by the 
Division in compliance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Rules cannot be used to create new law for which the basis does not 
exist in statute. Rules are the "flesh" put on the "skeleton" of 
the statute. Because rules are adopted by the Division, they can 
be repealed, replaced, or amended by the Division. It is important 
to remember that if the Legislature has not established the basis 
for law by rule in the statute, the Division cannot establish the 
rule. 
The Division carefully consults with the Boards in its effort to 
cause there to be changes in the statutes by enactment, amendment, 
or repeal; and, involves the Boards significantly in the 
development of rules to go through the administrative rulemaking 
process. Mutual efforts between the Boards and Division to cause 
the adoption, amendment, or repeal of rules normally involves a 
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written comment period and a public hearing during which written 
and verbal comments about the rules are carefully considered. 
Licensure 
The evaluation of applicants for licensure is one of the two major 
functions and responsibilities of the Division. 
Licensure is based upon the fact that an applicant meets some 
minimum standard. Licensure does not represent that the licensee 
has done anything more than meet minimum qualifications. 
The minimum standard is set forth in the law, either under the 
statute or rule pertaining to a particular license qualification. 
Many Boards have facilitated licensure by defining for the division 
the exact criteria to be used in determining if an applicant meets 
the minimum qualifications. In those cases, Division personnel 
evaluate the applicant against the established criteria. If the 
criteria are clearly met, licensure is granted. If criteria are 
clearly not met, licensure is denied. When necessary, the 
application is referred to the Board for consideration and its 
recommendation with respect to licensure. This method of handling 
applications for licensure results in the most expeditious handling 
of applicants. 
Other Boards have reserved the right to review in detail every 
application and to make a specific recommendation regarding each. 
This is usually associated with those classifications in which 
there are subjective qualifications for licensure such as 
experience or specific content in college course work. The 
expertise of the Board is necessary to permit there to be an 
appropriate review. This method of handling applications for 
licensure results in a longer delay in granting licensure and 
subjects the process to some criticism by individuals anxious to 
enter into practice. 
The Board, in consultation with the Division, must carefully 
consider the process by which licensure is granted or denied as 
there must be a careful balance between the right of the public to 
rely on the licensure process, and the right of the individual 
applicant to have a timely and fair review of the application. It 
seems much wiser to withhold granting a license to an individual 
about whom there is some question, rather than to grant the license 
in haste and then discover action is necessary to revoke, suspend 
or restrict the license because the person is not competent. 
It is not uncommon to have complaints leveled against the division 
and its Boards claiming that there is "gatekeeping" going on. This 
is a term applied to attempts to limit entry in to a profession by 
qualified persons by using the licensure process to artificially 
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restrict entry into the market. The Division will very carefully 
observe and evaluate recommendations of the Boards and the timely 
handling of applications to ensure that any such claim has no basis 
in fact. 
Under the laws to which the Division and Boards are subject, the 
authority to grant the license rests with the Division. The Board 
is to make a recommendation with respect to licensure. It is very 
rare that the Division does not follow the recommendation of a 
Board. The advice and recommendation of the Board is given the 
greatest consideration. 
The applicant may appeal the licensing decision to the Executive 
Director of the Department who may choose to convene a Special 
Appeals Board. A Special Appeals Board is made up of three 
individuals of whom one is a member of the profession/occupation 
under consideration. The Special Appeals Board hears the evidence 
presented by the applicant justifying issuance of the license and 
the evidence presented by the Attorney General's Office defending 
the decision of the Board and Division in denying the license. The 
decision of the Special Appeals Board is binding upon the Division. 
If the decision is adverse to the applicant, he still may appeal 
the decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In choosing to deny a license, the Board must give attention to its 
ability to clearly articulate the reasons for denial and to make 
sure the minutes of the meeting accurately set forth the reasons. 
The Board is afforded governmental immunity for its official 
actions; however, governmental immunity may not protect a Board 
member who acts maliciously without regard for the facts. If a 
Board member is ever asked to consider licensure of an individual 
about whom the member cannot act fairly, the member should declare 
the conflict of interest and excuse himself from voting on that 
particular matter. However, caution must be exercised. Just 
because a Board member may be privileged to information about an 
applicant which my indicate the individual may not be qualified for 
licensure, does not mean that he or she should not bring that 
information to the attention of the Board and vote on the matter if 
he or she can do so based upon cause, the facts, the public 
interest, and not a malicious intent to damage or harm the 
applicant. 
Disciplinary matters 
Unfortunately, licensees sometimes engage in unprofessional or 
unlawful conduct related to the occupation or profession in which 
they are licensed; or, unlicensed persons engage in acts or 
practices which are regulated under title 58. 
When such violations occur, the Bureau of Investigation normally 
conducts an investigation. If the investigation fails to document 
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unlawful or unprofessional conduct, the case is closed. 
If investigation documents unprofessional or unlawful conduct and 
the Office of the Attorney General determines that the 
investigation was adequate and that the proposed Petition is 
legally sufficient, the investigator who conducted the 
investigation files a Petition before the Division. A Petition is 
a document much like a Complaint filed in a criminal case. It 
describes the allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct and 
the laws which have been violated. 
The Division counsel reviews the Petition and determines if there 
is a basis to consider disciplinary action. If a basis if found, 
he issues a Notice of Agency Action which is mailed together with 
the Petition to the subject of the investigation, now called the 
Respondent. The Notice of Agency Action advises the Respondent 
that the action has been filed, describes the action, defines the 
procedures which will be followed, and advises the Respondent of 
his legal options. 
A Respondent is given thirty days to file a Response to the 
Petition. A Response is the Respondent's opportunity to admit, 
deny, or offer any explanation with respect to the allegations 
which have been filed against him. 
There are primarily two methods in which a matter is then resolved. 
In the first method, the Respondent contacts the Office of the 
Attorney General and requests to settle the case pending against 
him. The Office of the Attorney General consults with the 
Investigator and Bureau Manager. The Bureau Manager consults with 
a member of the Board. The Office of the Attorney General 
negotiates a Stipulation in which the Respondent admits to unlawful 
or unprofessional conduct and agrees to those sanctions necessary 
to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Sanctions may 
include reprimand, restriction, probation, suspension, and 
revocation of one's license and/or a cease and desist order. The 
Stipulation is then presented to the Division Director for his 
approval. The Director may either accept the Stipulation and issue 
an Order adopting its terms or may suggest modification to or 
reject the Stipulation. 
In the second method, if a matter is inappropriate for settlement, 
is appropriate but is not achieved, or if the Respondent simply 
denies the allegations and demands the matter be heard, a Hearing 
is scheduled before the appropriate Board. A Hearing is not unlike 
a trial. The Division sets forth its case and the Respondent has 
an opportunity to defend himself. Normally both sides are 
represented by counsel. 
The Administrative Procedures Act requires that all Hearings be 
held before a "Presiding Officer", who it defines as the Division 
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Director. However, the Act permits the Director to designate 
another individual or group of individuals to perform part of or 
all of his role. Because of the complexity and diversity of our 
proceedings, the director designates an Administrative Law Judge as 
the Presiding Officer to regulate the proceedings and the 
appropriate Board as the Presiding Officer to act as fact finder. 
The Director participates in the hearing to assist him in later 
acting upon the Boards' Recommended Order. The Director is not 
present during the Board's deliberations. 
As fact finder of the proceedings, the Board hears the evidence 
presented at the hearing, deliberates upon the evidence, and enters 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Recommended Order. 
As regulator of the proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge 
presides over motion practice and admissibility of evidence, and 
ensures that the proceedings are fair and orderly. Following the 
hearing, the Administrative Law Judge advises the Board during its 
deliberations and puts in writing the Board's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
One of the questions which always arises with a Board member who 
must consider a Recommended Order is, "What are the options we may 
consider in making a recommendation?" The answer is generally that 
Orders usually contain any one of more of the following conditions: 
1. Private censure or reprimand; 
2. Public censure or reprimand; 
3. Probation for some designated period of 
time with specific terms and conditions 
directed at protecting the public from 
continued acts or omissions which have 
represented the Respondent's practices 
in the past; 
4. Suspension of license for some designated 
period; 
5. Suspension of license for some designated 
period followed by probation with specific 
terms and conditions as in (3) above; 
6. Suspension of license, suspension stayed, 
probation with specific terms and conditions 
as in (3) above; 
7. Revocation of license; 
8. Revocation of license, revocations stayed, 
suspension for some designated period, 
followed by probation with specific terms 
and conditions as in (3) above; and 
9. Revocation of license, revocation stayed, 
probation with specific terms and conditions 
as in (3) above. 
In considering a Recommended Order, Board members should be 
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imaginative and draft an Order which offers creative solutions to 
the problems identified in the Hearing. 
Following issuance, the Board's written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order are presented to the 
Division Director for his review and issuance of a Final Order. In 
almost every case, the Director's Final Order affirms the Board's 
Recommended Order. However, on very infrequent occasions, the 
Director's Final Order modifies or rejects a part or all of the 
Board's Recommended Order and enters new or amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
After entry of an Order, the Respondent may appeal the Order to the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce through a Request 
for Agency Review, and after exhausting his administrative 
remedies, may appeal the Order to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
During the time in which the appeal is being considered, the effect 
of the Order is usually stayed, meaning it does not go into effect 
until the Executive Director or Court of Appeals has ruled on the 
appeal. 
Compensation 
Generally, a Board member is reimbursed for attendance at Board 
meetings at the rate of $60.00 for a half day meeting and $90.00 
for a full day meeting. 
Because of the number of Boards and the frequency of meetings, the 
cost of reimbursement for Boards can be a very substantial amount. 
Because of very tight budget restrictions, the Division asks for 
the cooperation of Boards in conducting their meetings in an 
efficient manner. This will help the Division live within its 
budget and not require diversion of funds from other programs such 
as an already limited out-of-state travel budget for Board members. 
Board members who are state employees being paid in their regular 
position at the time Board meetings are held are not compensated 
for their attendance at Board meetings. 
If a Board member is required to travel on state business, the 
Board member will be compensated for the costs of travel, lodging, 
meals and other necessary expenses in accordance with existing 
state policy. 
The obligation to compensate Board members for Board attendance 
must be pre-approved by the Bureau Manager responsible for the 
particular Board. The obligation to compensate Board members for 
travel must be pre-approved by the Division Director and Department 
Executive Director. 
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Media Contacts 
There may be occasions when the representatives of the media 
contact Board members for comment on an issue facing the Board or 
one involving the profession or occupation regulated by the Board. 
The media serve the public and have been helpful to the Division in 
having the public understand the role of the Division and its 
Boards. It is our intent to be cooperative in every way possible. 
Remember that Boards may be called upon to act as fact finders and 
to issue a Recommended Order in a case involving a licensee. If 
Board members discuss a particular case with the media, they may 
well disqualify themselves from being able to fulfill their duties 
in hearing that case in a formal Hearing. 
If a Board member has any questions about discussing any matter 
with the media, please feel free to call the Bureau Manager, the 
Division Director, or even the Executive Director of the Department 
for counsel and advice. 
Liaison With the Division 
A Board member's primary contact with the Division is the Bureau 
Manager with Division management responsibility for their Board and 
the Board Secretary assigned to their Board. 
The Bureau Manager represents the Division in the normal working 
relationship between the Board and the Division. The manager is 
charged with knowing the position and philosophy of the Division 
Director, the Department Executive Director and the Governor with 
respect to the "business of the Division". 
The Board Secretary is supervised by the Bureau Manager and is a 
senior licensing specialist in the Bureau to which the particular 
Board is assigned and therefore, is very knowledgeable about the 
process of licensing. 
Board members are certainly welcome to communicate directly with 
the Division Director in any matter they desire. 
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When property is ordered turned over to the Division, the Chief 
shall determine the appropriate disposition. If the property is to be 
destroyed, the Chief shall assign two investigators to accomplish the 
destruction. The assigned investigators shall: 
(1) Inventory the items to be destroyed. 
(2) Note the time, date, and method of destruction. 
(3) Thoroughly destroy the items. 
(4) Return a sworn affidavit to the Director of the 
Department attesting to the destruction. 
At no time will an investigator authorize a law enforcement agency 
to keep any property seized under the authority of the Controlled 
Substance Act. 
[^  CITATIONS, 
(A) CITATION PROGRAM POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
1. These investigative policies and procedures implement the citation 
program established by §58-55-13, U.C.A. 
2. Where appropriate, citations may be issued by DOPL investigators 
for the following offenses: 
a. 58-55-2(32)(a). Engaging in a construction trade, acting as 
a contractor, or representing oneself to be engaged in a 
construction trade requiring licensure, unless the person 
doing any of these is appropriately licensed or exempted from 
licensure under this chapter; 
b. 58-55-2(32)(b). Acting in a construction trade beyond the 
scope of the license held; or 
c. 58-55-2(32)(c). hiring or employing in any manner an 
unlicensed person, other than an employee for wages who is not 
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required to be licensed under this chapter, to engage in a 
construction trade for which licensure is required or to act 
as a contractor or subcontractor in a construction trade 
requiring licensure. 
For purposes of the citation program an investigator is defined as 
an investigator assigned to the Contractors Section of the Bureau 
of Investigations and an auditor assigned to the Bureau of 
Financial Audit. 
When a citation is inappropriate, investigators shall, as 
appropriate, close a complaint or an investigation without action, 
screen a completed case with the Division Enforcement Counsel for 
stipulated settlement or for review prior to issuance of a Notice 
of Agency Action commencing an informal adjudicative proceeding, or 
screen a completed case with the Office of the Attorney General for 
review prior to issuance of a Notice of Agency Action commencing a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. 
Citations shall only be issued for citable offenses that are 
actually observed by an investigator or are documented by an 
investigator through a completed investigation in which the 
investigator has had recent personal contact with the subject of 
the investigation. All citations will be issued in person by the 
investigator to the recipient of the citation. 
Citations shall not be issued beyond six months following the date 
of the citable offense. 
Investigators are instructed to utilize the citation program to 
encourage compliance with the Construction Trades Licensing Act. 
When appropriate extenuating or mitigating circumstances are 
present, an investigator may choose to advise an offender that the 
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investigator will not issue a citation if the offender comes into 
compliance with applicable law within a reasonable period of time. 
Before issuing citations for citable offenses, investigators shall 
ensure that every element of the offense for which a citation is to 
be issued is supported by competent evidence and shall explore 
possible defenses and mitigating, extenuating, and aggravating 
circumstances, if any. Investigators shall promptly record such 
information in the documentation section on the back side of the 
investigator's copy of the citation. 
The format for citations shall be as established at exhibit 1. 
Citations shall be color coded and bear the following legend: 
Copy 1 - Recipient Copy 
Copy 2 - Division Copy 
Copy 3 - Supervisor Copy 
Copy 4 - Investigator Copy 
Numbered books of citations shall be issued to each DOPL 
investigator and shall be an accountable item. 
There is established a DOPL Recommended Citation Fine Schedule at 
exhibit 2. The Schedule shall appear on the reverse side of the 
recipient's copy of citations. 
The DOPL Citation Fine Schedule shall apply to all citations issued 
by investigators in which a fine is issued. If an investigator 
believes a more serious outcome is warranted in an individual case, 
the investigator shall proceed by filing a petition. 
Investigators are encouraged to issue cease and desist orders with 
each citation. Normally, a cease and desist order should be issued 
in addition to a fine; however, where appropriate, a cease and 
desist order may be issued without a fine. Investigators shall 
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promptly record their justification for the issuance of a cease and 
desist order without a fine in the documentation section on the 
back side of the investigator's copy of the citation. 
When a person to be cited has committed multiple offenses under the 
same or different offense codes, investigators should evaluate the 
seriousness of the overall violation of law in determining whether 
to issue a single citation or multiple citations. Multiple 
offenses cited under a single citation shall collectively be 
considered as a single offense. The applicable fine from the DOPL 
Citation Fine Schedule for a citation involving multiple offenses 
shall be the fine applicable to the most serious offense. 
Every citation shall include a fine and/or a cease and desist 
order. At the present time, the division has opted not to 
implement a notice in lieu of a citation, as permitted by Section 
58-55-13(4)(c), U.C.A. 
There is established a Notice of Response format at exhibit 3. 
Notices of Response shall be included in the back of citation 
books. Investigators shall provide a Notice of Response to the 
each recipient of a citation. 
If the recipient of a citation refuses to sign for the receipt of 
the citation, this fact shall be noted in the remarks section of 
the citation. 
Investigators shall avoid advising the recipient of a citation how 
to respond to a citation. Instead, the recipient should be 
referred to the Citation and the Notice of Response documents 
themselves or to their attorney. Care should be taken to avoid 
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creating any impression that the fine and/or cease and desist order 
imposed by the citation is effective immediately without an 
opportunity to be heard. 
Investigators shall not negotiate stipulated settlements or accept 
payment of administrative fines. 
Investigators shall coordinate the issuance of a citation with 
their supervisor no later than the next business day following 
issuance and shall promptly send or deliver to the Division its 
copy of the citation. The supervisor shall promptly perform a 
Citation Quality Control Review and may choose to dismiss a 
citation where appropriate. 
Citations become final upon receipt of a Notice of Response 
reflecting that the recipient of a citation has chosen not to 
contest the citation. If no response is received from the 
recipient of a citation, the citation shall become final 20 days 
from the service thereof. If a citation is timely contested, it 
becomes final upon entry of an order by the presiding officer 
affirming or modifying the citation. 
Following the issuance of citations, investigators shall not 
subsequently issue follow-on citations for a continuation of the 
offense at the same location to the recipient of an initial 
citation until the initial citation becomes final unless, upon a 
showing of unusual and compelling circumstances, the investigator's 
supervisor approves a deviation from this policy. Deviations shall 
be recorded in the documentation section on the back side of the 
investigator's copy of the citation. 
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The Division shall notify each person contesting a citation of the 
date, time, and place of the scheduled hearing along with the 
identity of the presiding officer by completing the Notice of 
Hearing on the reverse side of the Notice of Response (exhibit 4), 
and mailing a copy of the Notice of Hearing to the person by first 
class mail, postage prepaid. 
Hearings for contested citations requested on or before the first 
of each month shall, unless circumstaces require the Division to 
schedule a different date, be held on the 3rd Monday of that month 
beginning at 9:00 a.m., in room 428, before a Presiding Officer 
designated by the Division Director. If the 3rd Monday is a 
holiday, the hearing shall be moved to the fourth Monday of the 
month. 
If the recipient of a citation denies committing the offense cited, 
it is the Division's burden to present competent evidence on each 
of the issues under consideration at a hearing to a preponderance 
of evidence standard. 
It is the Respondent's right to testify, present evidence, and 
comment on the issues at a hearing. In putting on evidence, 
Respondents may testify, call and examine witnesses, and introduce 
documentary evidence. 
Either party may testify, present evidence or comment on the issues 
at a hearing with or without the assistance of counsel. 
a. When proceeding without counsel, a Respondent may and the 
Division shall simply inform the Presiding Officer what 
evidence is available for presentation and permit the 
Presiding Officer to take such evidence as he deems 
appropriate. 
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b. A Respondent may in addition choose to act as his own counsel. 
c. It is the responsibility of a party who is proceeding without 
counsel, to arrange to have all necessary evidence available 
for presentation at the hearing. 
The public perception of the hearing process hinges on their 
perception of the role of the Presiding Officer. The integrity of 
the role of Presiding Officer is therefore critical and must be 
fully understood, scrupulously respected, and carefully protected 
by all involved in the citation process, particularly the Division. 
a. The Presiding Officer is appointed by the Director, Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Department of 
Commerce. 
b. The Presiding Officer is appointed as an impartial and 
objective fact finder designated to review the contested 
citations on the hearing docket. He is not an advocate of 
either the Division or the Respondent. 
c. In reviewing a contested citation, it is the Presiding 
Officer's responsibility to determine whether the offense 
shown on a contested citation is supported by competent 
evidence and if so, whether the citation should have been 
issued. If both questions are answered in the affirmative by 
the presiding officer, it is the Presiding Officer's 
responsibility to then determine whether the sanction imposed 
by the citation should be affirmed, rejected, or modified. 
d. In accordance with §63-46b-5(e) and Rule 2 of the Model 
Administrative Discovery Rules for Agency Adjudicative 
Proceedings, the Presiding Officer may issue subpoeKf^s or 
other orders to compel the production of necessary evidence, 
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by his own action or upon the request of either party. 
Normally, the Presiding Officer will only issue a subpoena or 
other order upon the request of a party and it is the 
responsibility of the party requesting the subpoena or other 
order to show probable cause for the issuance of the order, 
e. To ensure that contested citation hearings are handled 
consistently by Presiding Officers, the Informal Contested 
Citations Hearing Instructions, the Presiding Officer Script 
and Presiding Officer Model Orders at exhibits 5, 6, 9, and 10 
respectively, are prepared as recommended guides. 
Issuing investigators shall be responsible for initial entry of 
their citations into the CRIS data base. 
The Administrative Assistant to the Division Director shall be 
responsible for tracking the receipt of Notices of Response, for 
preparing a monthly Contested Citation Hearing Docket and a monthly 
Uncontested Citation Report, and for creating and maintaining 
Citation Hearing Files. Citation Hearing Files shall be maintained 
by year of issuance and citation number. 
The Supervisor, Bureau of Investigations, Construction Trades 
Licensing Act Section, shall be responsible for a monthly Pending 
Citation Report and Closed Citation Report using the CRIS data 
base. Disposition shall be determined by an evaluation of Citation 
Quality Control Reviews, the Citation Hearing Docket, the 
Uncontested Citation Report, Orders issued by the Presiding 
Officer, and the passage of time. 
a) The Pending Citation Report shall be alphabetically arranged 
and shall contain the following information: 
i) person cited; 
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ii) date of issuance; 
iii) place of issuance; 
iv) offense code; 
v) sanction; 
vi) issuing investigator; 
vii) response deadline; and 
viii) current status, 
b) The Closed Citation Report shall be alphabetically arranged 
and shall contain the following information: 
i) person cited; 
ii) date of issuance; 
iii) place of issuance; 
iv) offense code; 
v) sanction; 
vi) issuing investigator; 
vii) disposition; and 
viii) method of disposition. 
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CITATION 
Department of Commerce 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Construction Compliance Section 
P.O. Box 45805 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
ISSUED PURSUANT TO § 58-55-13(5) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS AMENDED, AS FOLLOWS: 
ISSUED TO: DL#: 
DOB: S.S.f: DOPL#: 
HOME ADDRESS: PHONE*: 
DBA/EMPLOYER: DOPL LIC#: 
BUSINESS ADDRESS: PHONE#: 
DATE OF OFFENSE: DATE ISSUED: TIME OF OFFENSE: 
LOCATION OF OFFENSE: 
OFFENSE CODE DESCRIPTION 
• 558-55-2(32)(a) 
Engaged in or represented himself to be engaged in a construction 
trade or acted as or represented himself to be acting as a 
contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure while not 
licensed or excepted from licensure. 
D 558-55-2(32)(b) Acted in a construction trade beyond the scope of the license held. 
D S58-55-2(32)(c) Hired or employed in any manner an unlicensed contractor or person 
who was required to be licensed. 
REMARKS: 
D ADMINISTRATIVE FINE ( S e e r e v e r s e ) D CEASE AND DESIST ORDER 
I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS CITATION AND 
CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE 
RIGHTS ADVISEMENT CONTAINED BELOW AND HAVE 
BEEN PROVIDED A NOTICE OF RESPONSE 
R E C I P I E N T ' S SIGNATURE DATE 
I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION IN THIS 
CITATION IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 
INVESTIGATOR'S SIGNATURE 
READ CAREFULLY 
This citation may be contested by notifying the Division in writing within 20 calendar days 
of the service of the citation that you wish to contest the citation at a hearing conducted 
under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. A citation which is not so 
contested becomes the final order of the Division and is not subject to further agency 
review. Any person who fails to comply with a citation after it becomes the final order of 
the Division is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and the Division may refuse to issue or renew 
or may suspend, revoke, or place on probation a license you hold or apply for. 
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ExniDir z 
MAXIMUM FINE SCHEDULE PERMITTED BY S 58-55-13(4)(i), U.C.A. 
First Offense 
Second Offense 
Subsequent Offenses 
$1,000 
$2,000 
$2,000 per day 
DOPL CITATION FINE SCHEDULE 
FIRST OFFENSE 
Violation 
58-55-2(32)(a) 
58-55-2(32)(b) 
58-55-2(32)(c) 
All Except 
Electrical 
or Plumbing 
$200.00 
$200.00 
$400.00 
Electrical 
or Plumbing 
$400.00 
$400.00 
$600.00 
SECOND OFFENSE 
Violation 
58-55-2(32)(a) 
58-55-2(32)(b) 
58-55-2(32)(c) 
All Except 
Electrical 
or Plumbing 
$600.00 
$600.00 
$800.00 
Electrical 
Plumbing 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,200.00 
THIRD OFFENSE 
Citations shall not be issued for third offenses except in 
extraordinary circumstances approved in writing by the 
Division Director. 
Note: If multiple offenses are cited on the same citation, 
the fine shall be determined by evaluating the most serious 
offense. 
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Exhibit 3 
NOTICE OF RESPONSE 
Department of Commerce 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Construction Compliance Section 
P.O. Box 45805 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
CITATION # 
NAME: 
DATE OF CITATION: 
PHONE NUMBER: 
ADDRESS: 
THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN 
WRITING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU 
WISH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63, 
CHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT 
CONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT 
BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR AND THE DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY 
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR. 
PLEA8E SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING 
TO THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU: 
_ _ 1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION, 
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH IT8 
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL 
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION. 
___ 2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION 
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
OFFENSE. 
_ _ 3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION 
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION. 
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION 
OF RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL 
NOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT 
THE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME. 
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING 
OFFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ISSUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED, 
SUSPENDED, REMITTED, OR VACATED). 
SIGNATURE: DATE: 
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Exhibit 4 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Department of Commerce "NUMBER" 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Construction Compliance Section 
P.O. Box 45805 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
S>ursuant to your racpaest,. a Citation Hearing has been scheduled for 
, beginning at in Room of the Kfebsr M* 
Wells Bld<j, located at l€0 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, !££• Th& 
presiding officer is
 w w_ w w_^* TJbte hearing is your 
opportunity to put en evidence and comment on the issues. 
In compliance *dm the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids 
and services) during this meeting should notify Jud Weiler, ADA Coordinator, Division ofOccupational and Professional Licensing, 160 East 
4J00 Soum,Saa Lake Oty, Utah 84145-(»aS.ph^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 199 , a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING was sent first class 
mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
(Recipient of Citation) 
(Address) 
(City), (State) (Zip) 
(Name) 
(Title) 
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EXHIBIT 5 
INFORMAL CONTESTED CITATION HEARING INSTRUCTIONS 
At your request, the citation you received has been scheduled 
for a hearing as shown in the Notice of Hearing. Your case 
will be heard in the order shown on the hearing docket posted 
on the hearing room door. 
These instructions have been prepared to help you understand 
the hearing process and to enable you to prepare for your 
hearing. 
The statutes and rules governing contested citation hearings 
are the following: Chapter 46b, Title 63, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act; Chapter 1, Title 58, Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing Act; Chapter 55, Title 58, 
Construction Trades Licensing Act; and Rules 151-46b and 156-
46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act rules. 
Dan S. Jones has been designated by the Director of the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing to serve 
as the Presiding Officer for these hearings. Please address 
him as Mr. Jones. 
The Presiding Officer is an neutral fact finder designated to 
review contested citations. He is not an advocate for the 
Division or for the Respondent. 
The only issues properly before the Presiding Officer are as 
follows: 
a. Was there a legal basis to issue the citation? 
b. If so, was it fair to issue the citation? 
c. If so, what is the appropriate penalty? 
You may represent yourself or be represented by counsel. 
Ordinarily, the Division is not represented by counsel at 
contested citation hearings. 
If you are denying the offense, it is the Division's 
responsibility to prove its case against you by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you are admitting the 
offense, it is your responsibility to prove that the citation 
should be dismissed or that the penalty should be reduced. 
The Administrative Procedures Act provides that the parties in 
an informal hearing are entitled to testify, present evidence 
and comment on the issues. In presenting evidence, the 
parties may examine witnesses and submit exhibits. 
A the request of either party, the Presiding Officer will 
examine the witnesses called by a party. 
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11. Exhibits should be premarked numerically by the Division and 
alphabetically by the Respondent. Where several exhibits will 
be offered, an index is desirable. 
12. The Presiding Officer will exclude any evidence he deems 
irrelevant, repetitious, or improper. 
13. If the Presiding Officer finds that the citation is 
appropriate, he will impose the fine shown on the DOPL 
Citation Fine Schedule unless good cause is shown for a lesser 
or greater amount. 
14. If a fine is imposed, it is payable immediately unless good 
cause is shown for delayed payment. Scheduling the hearing 
results in a significant delay in which you can prepare to pay 
a possible fine. Therefore, good cause may be difficult to 
establish. 
15. Appearing at this hearing does not in itself constitute good 
cause for a reduction in fine. Rather, you must prove that a 
reduction in fine is justified. 
16. Moreover, compliance with the law after your citation was 
issued is not considered good cause for a reduction in fine. 
Likewise, noncompliance with the law after your citation was 
issued is not good cause to increase any fine imposed in this 
case. However, it could result in additional disciplinary 
action. 
17. Ordinarily, a written order will be entered at the conclusion 
of each hearing. However, where necessary, the Presiding 
Officer will take a case under advisement and mail a decision 
to the parties as soon as possible following the hearing. 
18. The order will include a notice of any right of administrative 
or judicial review available to the parties. 
19. If you have any questions concerning these instructions please 
ask the Presiding Officer for an explanation before your case 
is heard. You will be asked to submit a signed copy of these 
instructions to the Presiding Officer at that time. 
I affirm that I have read and understand the instructions outlined 
above, 
Respondent 
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TabM 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
P.O.Box 45805 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR RECORD 
Requester: W i l l i a m »1. . S t i l l i n g Parsons, ftehlpr & I at.impr 
7 1Q Q 4 
Written Request Received: Date: / " 1 Q ^ 
IX] Request approved: [ ] In full [XJ In part 
KXI Record(s) are attached. 
[ ] Call to make arrangements. 
[ ] A fee of $ is due for duplicating the record(s). 
[ ] Because the record is non-public, we require evidence of your identity before the record can be released. 
[ ] The attached Disclosure and Agreement must be completed and returned before the non-public record(s) can be 
released. 
[ ] Request denied: [ ] In full [ ] In part 
[ ] Notice of Denial of Request for Records is attached for explanation. 
[ ] Request is neither approved or denied: [ ] In full [ ] In part 
[ ] Notice of Estimated Time Required to Respond to Request for Records is attached for explanation. 
IX] Other: - See explanatory comments on backside 
[ ] The Division does not maintain the following record(s) you request: 
[ ] The entity that we believe does maintain the record is: 
Contact Person: Carol Inglesby Telephone: 53Q-6626 
DOPL-FM-GRAMA-003 REV 6/7/94 SEE REVERSE 
EXPLANATORY COMMENTS: 
Request #1 - Documents are enclosed with regards to the citation issued to Dockery 
Roofing,—The other cases that have been converted to formal are the Merit Electrical ^  
et al cases- I believe your office has already received copies of these cases. If 
you need an additional copy, please contact me 530-6626. 
Request #2 - In reviewing records, there have been no adjudicative proceedings that 
were converted from informal to formal or formal to informal with the exception 
of the citation cases mentioned above. 
Request #3 - not applicable 
Request #4 - In a telephone conversation with Barbara Polich of your office on 
7-26-94 with Robert Hunt, she indicated your office did not want a ropy of all citatiolhs 
issued but would rather have a statistical summary regarding citations. That summary ||is 
pnrlnspH. Tn yrmr rpqiipst. you askftd fnr "t.hp prnrpdural trark fnr adjndirating thnsp 
citations". Our office is unclear as to exactly what you are asking for. The Divisio|fi 
doe* hax/P a r i t a f i n n p n l i r i p g and prnrpdtirps manual. HflWPVPr, that, manual i s a 
protected record. You may however want to contact Robert Hunt, Assistant Attorney 
General, regarding possible release of thp manual with the understanding its contents 
would remain protected. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
C(MJ W 0^0?V) Date: 7-28-94 
Title: . . . . 
Administrative Assistant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the **V day of J u l y .1994
 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR RECORD was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the requester at the 
following address indicated on the Request for Record(s): 
William J. Stilling 
Parsons Behler & Latimer 
201 South Main Street Suite 1800 
SLC UT 84101 
(MWMimmf 
T i t l e :
 Adminstrative Assistant 
CITATION STATS 
From 10-01-92 To 07-15-94 
CITATIONS ISSUED 1313 
COMPLIANCE WITH CITATION 971 
DISMISSED BY DIVISION 25 
OVERTURNED AT HEARING 43 
CEASE AND DESIST 76 
CONVERTED TO FORMAL ACTION 6 
Merit Electric 
Kit Carson 
Jonathan Juretich 
Dan Johnson 
Chris Schiffman 
Dockery Roofing, Inc. 
CITATION CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 1 
PENDING ENFORCEMENT/CRIMINAL 1 
PENDING ENFORCEMENT/CIVIL 61 
ISSUED PENDING RESPONSE 133 
ISSUED PENDING HEARING 6 
WENT TO HEARINGS 314 
CITATION FINES $274,840.00 
UNCONTESTED CITATIONS 1,094 
